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THE SUPREME COURT AND GENDER-NEUTRAL LANGUAGE: SETTING 
THE STANDARD OR LAGGING BEHIND? 
LESLIE M. ROSE* 
[T]he law lives through language and we must be very careful about the 
language we use.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Law students learn the law and the language of the law from casebooks – 
casebooks filled with Supreme Court opinions.  So, for example, when students 
begin Constitutional Law they will read Chief Justice John Marshall’s influential 
1803 opinion in Marbury v. Madison and learn that: 
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual 
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. . . .  [The] 
government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of 
laws, and not of men.2 
Continuing through the Constitutional Law text about 500 pages, law 
students will read Lochner v. New York, written 100 years after Marbury, and 
discover that: 
In every case that comes before this court, therefore, [the] question necessarily 
arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the [police power], or 
is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of 
the individual to his personal liberty or to enter into those contracts in relation 
to labor which may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support of 
himself and his family?3 
Jump ahead another century to Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,4 an 
important case from the 2008 Supreme Court Term,5 likely to appear in future 
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 1. Justice Anthony Kennedy, The Supreme Court – Kennedy Interview Part 3, 
http://www.lawprose.org/interviews/supreme_court.php (last visited on October 14, 2009). 
 2. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4 (15th ed. 2004). 
 3. Id. at 493. 
 4. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2541 (2009) (holding that affidavits of forensics experts are “testimonial” and 
thus subject to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment). 
 5. See Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court, Tipped by Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A3. 
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casebooks.  Here, students will be confronted with a description of a 
constitutional right framed in language that excludes women: 
The defendant always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause 
objection; notice-and-demand statutes simply govern the time within which he 
must do so. . . .  It is common to require a defendant to exercise his rights under 
the Compulsory Process Clause in advance of trial, announcing his intent to 
present certain witnesses.  [Citations omitted.]  There is no conceivable reason 
why he cannot similarly be compelled to exercise his Confrontation Clause 
rights before trial.6  
 
What students learn from these opinions may not be limited to what the 
authors intended.  They will learn that “male” is the norm,7 even in the world of 
law, and they might wonder if Marbury and Lochner were even intended to 
apply to women, since both cases predate female suffrage.8  Marbury and Lochner 
reflect their historical time in their use of masculine pronouns to refer to all 
people.  However, today, when clarity and precision are paramount in legal 
writing, and more than half of today’s law students are women, the Supreme 
Court should be embracing gender-neutral language. 
Most modern legal writing texts and style manuals recommend that writers 
use gender-neutral language.9  Gender-neutral language is achieved by avoiding 
the use of “gendered generics” (male or female nouns and pronouns used to 
refer to both men and women).  For example, gender neutrality could be 
achieved by referring to “Members of Congress,” rather than “Congressmen,” 
and by changing a few words in the previous quotation from Melendez-Diaz: 
“The defendant always has [the] burden of raising a Confrontation Clause 
objection; statutes simply govern the time within which the [defendant] must do 
so.”10 
As this article demonstrates, most members of the United States Supreme 
Court still use male-gendered generics regularly.  This practice freezes the Court 
in the non-inclusive and imprecise writing style of Marbury and Lochner and 
perpetuates a style of communication that no longer suits the needs of modern 
practice. 
Most of the advice on gender-neutral writing is directed at lawyers and law 
students; it emphasizes that this technique is part of good advocacy and 
effective communication with the reader – usually a judge.11  This advice applies 
 
 6. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541. 
 7. See CASEY MILLER & KATE SWIFT, THE HANDBOOK OF NONSEXIST WRITING 3 (1980) ("What 
standard English usage says about males, for example, is that they are the species.  What it says 
about females is that they are a subspecies."). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 9. See infra Section II.B. 
 10. See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541. 
 11. See, e.g., STEVEN STARK, WRITING TO WIN xiii (2000) (“I’ve tried to focus on the writing of 
lawyers, not judges.”); RICHARD WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS 3 (5th ed. 2005); ANNE 
ENQUIST & LAUREL CURRIE OATES, JUST WRITING: GRAMMAR, PUNCTUATION, AND STYLE FOR THE 
LEGAL WRITER 1–2 (2d ed. 2005); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART 
OF PERSUADING JUDGES xxi–xxiv (2008). 
Rose_cpcxns.doc 5/5/2010  1:53:36 PM 
 THE SUPREME COURT AND GENDER-NEUTRAL LANGUAGE 83 
equally to judges.12  Despite these recommendations, the practice is not 
universal among legal writers.13  It can be hard to convince both new and 
experienced legal writers that the heightened consciousness and extra editing 
required to achieve gender neutrality is worth the effort when a similar effort is 
not reflected in their models – the appellate court opinions they read, 
particularly the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
This article argues that the members of the Supreme Court should avoid 
the use of gendered generics because such language communicates subtle 
sexism, distracts the reader, and creates ambiguity.14  Whether considered 
through the prism of feminism, or through the lens of the modern legal writing 
movement’s emphasis on clarity and reader reaction, the Court’s continued use 
of male-gendered terms to refer to all people can no longer be seen as benign.  
As the most influential members of the legal profession, the justices should be 
setting the standard, creating a model for law students and lawyers.  
Unfortunately, most of the justices are not.15 
This article analyzes the Court’s use of gender-neutral language during the 
2006, 2007, and 2008 Terms.16  This research shows that only one justice 
consistently uses gender-neutral language, that four justices consistently use 
generic male pronouns, and that the rest fall somewhere in between. 
Part I of this article defines gender-neutral language, discusses alternatives 
to gendered generics, and summarizes the concerns of the critics of the gender-
neutral language movement.  Part II reviews the key developments in the 
modern history of the shift toward gender-neutral language, generally and in 
the legal arena.  Part III explains why gender-neutral language in judicial 
opinions matters by reviewing relevant social science research on subtle sexism 
and placing judicial writing in the larger field of modern legal writing.  Part IV 
presents and analyzes the results of research into the language used by the 
members of the Roberts Court.  The article concludes that the members of the 
Court should and can increase their use of gender-neutral language without 
sacrificing style.  The Supreme Court’s influence on legal thinking is so 
 
 12. See, e.g., JOYCE J. GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK 417–22 (5th ed. 2007); 
RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 234–37 (1990). 
 13. See generally Pat K. Chew & Lauren K. Kelly-Chew, Subtly Sexist Language, 16 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 643, 646 (2007) (reporting results of research showing that judges, lawyers, and legal 
scholars “continue to use male-gendered words.”). 
 14. Several legal writing experts and scholars have identified similar reasons in support of 
gender-neutral language.  See, e.g., ENQUIST & OATES, supra note 11, at 147 ("For legal writers, there 
are at least four good reasons for making the effort to use gender-neutral language: fairness, clarity, 
precision, and reader reaction."); Judith D. Fischer, Framing Gender: Federal Appellate Judges’ Choices 
About Gender-Neutral Language, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 486–88 (2009) (noting that legal writers should 
use gender-neutral language because it is fairer, “more exact,” and "it benefits the writer's cause."). 
 15. Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Shirley Abrahamson has noted that, compared to the legal 
academy, “the courts are lagging behind,” in the use of gender-neutral language.  See Shirley S. 
Abrahamson, Toward A Courtroom of One’s Own: An Appellate Court Judge Looks at Gender Bias, 61 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1209, 1218 (1992-1993). 
 16. The 2008 Term refers to Supreme Court decisions issued between October 2008 and June 
2009; the 2007 Term refers to decisions issued between October 2007 and June 2008; the 2006 Term 
refers to decisions issued between October 2006 and June 2007. 
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profound that its responsibility extends beyond reaching results to 
communicating those results as effectively as possible. 
I. WHAT IS GENDER-NEUTRAL LANGUAGE? 
A.  Gender-Neutral Language Defined 
In its broadest sense, gender-neutral language is achieved by avoiding 
“gendered generics,” which are masculine or feminine nouns and pronouns 
used to refer to both men and women.17  For example, gender neutrality could 
be achieved by referring to “police officers,” rather than “policemen,” or by 
changing a few words in the earlier quote from Marbury v. Madison: “The very 
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of [all] individual[s] to claim 
the protection of the laws, whenever [they] receive[] an injury.”18 
In discussing gender-neutral language, some authors focus exclusively on 
the avoidance of male generics.19  This makes sense because there are few 
examples, historically, of the inappropriate use of female generics.20  Writers 
often refer to such language as “sexist.”21  The “sexist” label, however, may not 
be the best way to further the goal of linguistic change.  While male-gendered 
generics may communicate “subtle sexism,” one should not assume that the 
writer is “sexist.”22  The use of such a negative term may have the unintended 
effect of unfairly labeling the writer and closing down discussion.23 
This article steps out of the paradigm of “sexist language” to frame the 
discussion in a way that focuses on the multiple reasons for legal writers, 
 
 17. See ANNE CURZAN, GENDER SHIFTS IN THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 9 (2003).  Curzan explains 
that she uses the term "gendered, an adjective derived from a verb," because “gender effectively 
captures the ways in which scholars . . . have argued that gender is a kind of performance – sets of 
repeated behavior through which we create gendered selves and perpetuate gender categories."  In 
addition, the term "gendered serves as a convenient means of categorizing the set of linguistic forms 
that carry gender in a given language."  See also Chew & Kelley-Chew, supra note 13, at 644 
(discussing “male-gendered generics”); Fischer, supra note 14, at 475–77 (discussing “false generics” 
and “the pseudo-generic masculine”). 
 18. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 2. 
 19. See, e.g., LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 280 (2d ed. 2007) ("Gender-
neutral language is language that avoids masculine nouns and pronouns for general reference."); 
BRYAN A. GARNER, THE REDBOOK, A MANUAL ON LEGAL STYLE 315 (2d ed. 2006) (“Gender-neutral 
language.  Masculine pronouns . . . should be avoided unless you’re writing only about men.”). 
 20. See Fischer, supra note 14, at 475–76 (noting that gender-biased language “is most often 
directed against women, and its negative effects are typically experienced by women.”). 
 21. See, e.g., HELENE S. SHAPO, MARILYN R. WALTER & ELIZABETH FAJANS, WRITING AND 
ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 244-46 (5th ed. 2008); MARY BARNARD RAY & JILL J. RAMSFIELD, LEGAL 
WRITING: GETTING IT RIGHT AND GETTING IT WRITTEN 382 (4th ed. 2005); Janet K. Swim, Robyn 
Mallett & Charles Stangor, Understanding Subtle Sexism: Detection and Use of Sexist Language, 51 SEX 
ROLES 117, 119 (2004); Janet B. Parks & Mary Ann Roberton, Development and Validation of an 
Instrument to Measure Attitudes Toward Sexist/Nonsexist Language, 42 SEX ROLES 415, 420 (2000). 
 22. See Chew & Kelley-Chew, supra note 13, at 655 (“[E]mpirical research offers substantial 
evidence that using male-gendered generics is a form of subtle sexism, even though the user does 
not necessarily have sexist intentions.”). 
 23. See CURZAN, supra note 17, at 5 (“The complexity of speech communities and the nature of 
most language changes makes clear the difficulty and undesirability in most cases of 'assigning 
responsibility' for particular changes to particular speakers, particularly at the conscious level.”). 
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including judges, to move toward a gender-neutral style, by examining the 
language and its merits in a broader context that includes, but goes beyond, 
sexism.24  For purposes of this article, gender-neutral language is a more useful 
term,25 one that may make the message more likely to be heard.26  As Justice 
Ginsburg recently noted, “if you want to influence people, you want them to 
accept your suggestions, you don’t say, [‘]You don’t know how to use the 
English language[.”]  . . . It will be welcomed much more if you have a gentle 
touch than if you are aggressive.”27 
B. Alternatives to Gendered Generics 
The best course today is to eliminate sexist language while not resorting to ugly 
or awkward linguistic artifices.  The purpose, of course, is to avoid distracting 
any variety of readers, from traditional grammarians to feminists.28 
Alternatives to the most common and most non-inclusive gendered nouns 
are readily available in writing manuals.29  The Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles, made available on-line by the U.S. Department of Labor, provides many 
examples of job titles free from gender stereotyping, including “fisher” 
(fisherman), “worker” (workman), “appliance repairer” (repairman), and 
“salesperson” (salesman).30 
While avoidance of male-gendered pronouns is more challenging, a 
number of effective alternatives exist.  These include using plural nouns and 
pronouns (“pluralizing”), repeating the noun, using an article instead of a 
pronoun, using the relative pronoun “who,” using paired pronouns (“he or 
she”), and recasting the sentence to avoid the need for a pronoun.31  The most 
 
 24. See infra Section III. 
 25. Katherine Durack has noted that in the field of technical writing, nonsexist language and 
gender-neutral language are not necessarily synonymous: "nonsexist language is language with a 
political agenda: 'it works against sexism in society.  While many gender-neutral terms are consistent 
with nonsexist usage, the two are not the same[.]'"  Katherine T. Durack, Authority and Audience-
centered Writing Strategies: Sexism in 19th-century Sewing Machine Manuals, Technical Communication, 
TECHNICAL COMMUNICATION 180, 193-94 (1998) (quoting F.W. FRANK & P.A. TREICHLER, eds., 
LANGUAGE, GENDER, AND PROFESSIONAL WRITING 18 (1989)). 
 26. See Judith Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE 
& SOCIETY 952, 953 n.2 (1996) (noting that the first director of the National Judicial Education 
Program, which studied gender bias in the courts, “substituted the term gender bias for sexism after 
she discovered ‘in 1980 that judges attending the first judicial education programs on this topic were 
less resistant if the former term was used’[citation omitted]”). 
 27. Emily Bazelon, The Place of Women on the Court, THE N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 12, 2009, at 
25.  Justice Ginsburg was responding to a question about her successful approach, as a litigator, “at 
influencing a male lawyer’s brief without making him feel that [she] had taken over the case.” 
 28. BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 799 (2d ed. 1995). 
 29. See, e.g., ENQUIST & OATES, supra note 11, at 150–51; GARNER, supra note 19, at 316–17; 
EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 281; PUBLICATION MANUAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION 71–72 (5th ed. 2001). 
 30. Dictionary of Occupational Titles, http://www.occupationalinfo.org (last visited October 
14, 2009). 
 31. See, e.g., CURZAN, supra note 17, at 79 (noting that “Most current handbooks now recognize 
that generic he is sexist, advise avoiding it (often in no uncertain terms), and typically present three 
options for revising the construction: employ forms of he or she; make the sentence plural; or revise 
the entire construction to eliminate the need for a pronoun.  Many grammars also note that using the 
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noticeable technique is paired pronouns; most style manuals recommend using 
more “invisible” techniques whenever possible.32 
 A more controversial alternative that appears to be gaining popularity is 
the technique of alternating masculine and feminine pronouns.  Some style 
manuals include this as one acceptable approach to avoiding the generic use of 
masculine pronouns.33  A writer employing this technique might alternate 
between using male and female pronouns by book chapter, by page, or by 
actor.34  Some members of the Court use this approach occasionally; Justices 
Ginsburg and Stevens use it frequently by, for example, using male-gendered 
pronouns when referring generally to criminal defendants and female-gendered 
pronouns when referring generally to judges.35 
While this technique may be appropriate in some contexts, it can be 
problematic in scientific and legal writing.36  Alternating pronouns is not 
technically “gender neutral” and does not address the problems inherent in the 
use of gendered generics.37  Several studies by social scientists have 
demonstrated that this technique is an ineffective method for avoiding generic 
masculine pronouns because readers perceived alternating pronouns to be just 
as gender-biased as masculine pronouns and rated the text as lower in overall 
quality than text with male-gendered generics.38  In addition, the alternating 
 
construction he or she can get awkward if used too often.”); ENQUIST & OATES, supra note 11, at 148–
50; GARNER, supra note 19, at 315–16; SHAPO, WALTER & FAJANS, supra note 21, at 244-46; GARNER, 
supra note 28, at 800–01; EDWARD W. JESSEN, CALIFORNIA STYLE MANUAL, A HANDBOOK OF LEGAL 
STYLE FOR CALIFORNIA COURTS AND LAWYERS 174–75 (4th ed. 2000); PUBLICATION MANUAL OF THE 
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 29, at 66–67, 70–73. 
 32. Bryan Garner is an advocate of what he calls “invisible gender neutrality.”  See SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 11, at 116; THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE 233 (15th ed. 2003).  Garner 
recommends only limited use of paired pronouns because it “sounds stilted” and can be 
“obnoxious” if overused.  GARNER, supra note 19, at 316. 
 33. See, e.g., ENQUIST & OATES, supra note 11, at 149; WYDICK, supra note 11, at 75 (suggesting that 
a writer can use “she” to refer to judges in one paragraph, and “he” to refer to lawyers in the next, 
but warning that the technique “may look artificial”); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE BOOK OF ENGLISH 
USAGE, A PRACTICAL AND AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH (1996) available at 
http://www.bartleby.com/64/C005/014.html (noting that the use of alternating pronouns “has 
been gaining acceptance” in academic journals and acknowledging that while the practice may seem 
“cumbersome,” “alternating between he and she can offer a balanced way of proceeding.”). 
 34. See, e.g., JOAN AMES MAGAT, THE LAWYER'S EDITING MANUAL xi (2009) ("One currently 
popular convention is to vary the sex of the personage, signaling to the reader that it simply doesn't 
matter whether he reads or she writes or vice versa; what matters is what's read and what's written, 
and how.  That convention is as good as any other and is thus what I use here."). 
 35. See infra Section IV.E. 
 36. See DEBORAH E. BOUCHOUX, ASPEN HANDBOOK FOR LEGAL WRITERS 24 (2d ed. 2009) 
(advising legal writers to avoid alternating pronouns to achieve gender neutrality, “especially in a 
single document, especially in a single paragraph or section.  This attempt to be gender-inclusive is 
misguided and is disruptive to the flow of a project.”); GARNER, supra note 28, at 800 (warning that 
the technique is risky because “unintended connotations may invade the writing” and it might 
ultimately fail to achieve its intended goal). 
 37. See PUBLICATION MANUAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 29, at 
67 (“Alternating between he and she also may be distracting and is not ideal; doing so implies that he 
or she can in fact be generic, which is not the case.  Use of either pronoun unavoidably suggests that 
specific gender to the reader.”). 
 38. See Laura Madson & Jennifer Shoda, Alternating Between Masculine and Feminine Pronouns: 
Does Essay Topic Affect Readers' Perceptions?, 54 SEX ROLES 275, 282 (Feb 2006); see also, Angela 
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technique may be “jarring to the reader” due to the difficulty in “maintain[ing] 
two mental images”; more cognitive resources are required when the words are 
used in isolation.39  The authors of one study acknowledged that some writers 
might decide to risk using this technique to “motivate readers to think 
differently about sexism in language and in general.”40 
Several alternatives are not recommended or accepted in the world of 
formal legal writing, including the use of the word they as a singular pronoun 
and “slash constructions” (s/he, he/she).41  Although the use of they as a 
universal singular pronoun has deep historical roots,42 such use is not currently 
considered grammatical because it poses a problem of subject-verb agreement.  
While the singular they might slip by in speech, in formal writing it is more 
likely to be noticed and frowned upon.  Ultimately, it may become an accepted 
gender-neutral pronoun for use with both singular and plural antecedents,43 but 
law may be the last to adopt such a practice.44 
II. MODERN TRENDS IN GENDER-NEUTRAL LANGUAGE 
A.   General Trends 
Attempts to modify gender-biased language date back to the 12th 
Century.45  However, the modern feminist movement of the 1970s became the 
impetus for a renewed look at non-inclusive language, particularly concerning 
women.46  Most notable and most successful was the adoption of the term “Ms.” 
as an alternative to “Miss” and “Mrs.,” which eliminated the practice of 
announcing a woman’s marital status through the title, something not 
communicated by “Mr.”47 
 
Mucchi-Faina, Visible or influential?  Language reforms and gender (in)equality, 44 SOCIAL SCIENCE 
INFORMATION 189, 202 (2005) (discussing a 1999 study in which readers found an essay using 
alternating pronouns biased in favor of women and lower in quality compared to an essay in which 
paired pronouns were used). 
 39. Madson & Shoda, supra note 38, at 283. 
 40. Id. at 284. 
 41. See EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 282; GARNER, supra note 28, at 800. 
 42. See Patricia T. O’Conner & Stewart Kellerman, All-Purpose Pronoun, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, 
July 26, 2009, at 14. 
 43. See, e.g., CURZAN, supra note 17, at 80–81 (predicting that formal written language will 
eventually adapt to what has become acceptable in spoken language, but acknowledging that it will 
take “considerable time” because of conservative traditions); CASEY MILLER & KATE SWIFT, THE 
HANDBOOK OF NONSEXIST WRITING 47–49, 58 (2d ed. 2001) (predicting the "inevitable" acceptance of 
"they" as a singular pronoun); GARNER, supra note 28, at 801 (noting that while the use of they as a 
singular pronoun is “becoming commonplace,” it still “sets many literate Americans’ teeth on edge,” 
which Garner sees as “an unfortunate setback to what promises to be the ultimate solution to the 
problem.”); THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE 331 (1999) (noting that the 
use of "they" with indefinite pronouns like "everybody" is "standard in British English and informal 
US usage" and that it is a less awkward way to avoid the use of "his"). 
 44. See, e.g., ENQUIST & OATES, supra note 11, at 147 (noting that "the language of law" is "a bit 
slower to change than the language in other fields”). 
 45. See Mucchi-Faina, supra note 38, at 190. 
 46. Id. at 191. 
 47. See GARNER, supra note 28, at 802; MILLER & SWIFT, supra note 43, at 3 (noting the adoption of 
the term by the New York Times); Mucchi-Faina, supra note 38, at 191. 
Rose_cpcxns.doc 5/5/2010  1:53:36 PM 
88 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 17:81 2010 
In 1975, the American Psychological Association published its first 
guidelines on nonsexist language.48  Other academic and professional 
organizations including the American Philosophical Association,49 the Modern 
Language Association, and the American Medical Association, followed suit in 
the 1980s by requiring authors to use gender-neutral language.50 
In 1980, Casey Miller and Kate Swift published their groundbreaking book, 
The Handbook of Nonsexist Writing, to help writers, editors and speakers “free 
their language from unconscious semantic bias,”51 and “to provide practical 
suggestions to speakers and writers already committed to equality as well as 
clarity in style.”52  They included a discussion of “the pronoun problem” and the 
unsuccessful attempts to create a new generic pronoun.53 
Around the same time that Miller and Swift were providing writers with 
alternatives to “man as a false generic,”54 the authors of arguably the most 
popular book on writing were providing writers with numerous examples of 
male-gendered generics.  In the 1979 edition of the Elements of Style, Strunk and 
White used generic nouns and pronouns throughout the book,55 commenting in 
one section that “style not only reveals the spirit of the man but reveals his 
identity, as surely as would his fingerprints.”56  By 2000, however, the fourth 
edition of the book acknowledged that “many writers” find generic masculine 
pronouns “limiting or offensive” and offered some alternatives.57 
 
 48. See Mucchi-Faina, supra note 38, at 191.  The current guidelines can be found in the 
PUBLICATION MANUAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION 71–72 (5th ed. 2001). 
 49. The American Philosophical Association published its "Guidelines for Non-Sexist Use of 
Language" in 1986 to "reflect an organizational conviction that philosophers should take special care 
to avoid giving needless and unintended offense."  The Association recognized "the emotive force of 
words and . . . the ways in which language influences thought and behavior."  The Guidelines are 
available at http://www.apaonline.org/publications/texts/nonsexist.aspx (last visited June 20, 
2009). 
 50. See Madson & Shoda, supra note 38, at 275. 
 51. MILLER & SWIFT, supra note 7, at 1. 
 52. Id. at 2. 
 53. Id. at 46 (summarizing proposals for generic pronouns including: "thon," "co," "e," "tey," 
"na," and "per").  For a detailed history of the personal pronoun in Old and Middle English, see 
CURZAN, supra note 17, at 59-69, 189–94. 
 54. See id. at 13–18. 
 55. See, e.g., WILLIAM STRUNK JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 69 (3d ed. 1979) (“A 
writer is a gunner, sometimes waiting in his blind for something to come in, sometimes roaming the 
countryside hoping to scare something up.  Like other gunners, he must cultivate patience; he may 
have to work many covers to bring down one partridge.”); id. at 83 (“[T]he writer will discover, in 
the course of his work, that the setting of a word is just as restrictive as the setting of a jewel.”); id. at 
84 (“[S]tyle is the writer, and therefore what a man is, rather than what he knows, will at last 
determine his style.”). 
 56. Id. at 68. 
 57. STRUNK & WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 60 (4th ed. 2000) (“The use of he as a pronoun for 
nouns embracing both genders is a simple, practical convention rooted in the beginnings of English 
language.  Currently, however, many writers find the use of the generic he or his to rename indefinite 
antecedents limiting or offensive.”).  The text also notes that he or she can be awkward, id. at 60, and 
that the repeated use of plurals can result in “prose sounding general and diffuse.”  Id. at 61.  Finally, 
the authors fall back on the masculine generic: “No one need fear to use he if common sense 
supports it.  If you think she is a handy substitute for he, try it and see what happens.”  Id. 
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Also in 1979, the author of a paperback entitled Write Right! noted that 
“[t]he attention currently being given to sexism in our language is resulting in 
some wide swings of action and reaction.  We have not yet settled down to a 
steady middle course wherein we drop the unnecessarily sexist expressions but 
at the same time avoid the extremes advocated by some.”58  She welcomed the 
adoption of “Ms.” and “worker’s compensation,” but complained about “the 
flap over person v. man.”59 
By the mid-eighties, researchers who had reviewed three recently 
published American dictionaries reported a “trend toward nonsexism.”60  The 
preface to the second edition of Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary 
noted that the social and cultural movements of the seventies and eighties, 
including the women’s movement, had influenced “attitudes toward language 
and its use.”61  This influence was reflected in the authors’ efforts to “make the 
wording of the definitions and illustrative examples gender-neutral, and to 
point up, in relevant Usage Notes, current usage, choices, and attitudes 
regarding gender-neutral and gender-specific terms.”62 
In 1999, The Oxford American Dictionary and Language Guide placed the 
gender-specific definition for “man” first (“an adult human male, esp. as distinct 
from a woman or boy”) and the generic meaning (“human beings in general”) 
second.63  The accompanying usage note acknowledged that “many consider” 
the second definition “offensive and sexist.”64  The 2003 edition of The Chicago 
Manual of Style recommends the use of gender-neutral language and includes 
suggestions for achieving it, while acknowledging that “it takes thought and 
often some hard work.”65 
One of the most significant recent examples of the growing trend toward 
gender-neutral language can be found in Congress, where Representative Nancy 
Pelosi now wields the gavel as the first woman Speaker of the House.66  On 
January 5, 2009, the United States House of Representatives updated its standing 
rules to reflect gender neutrality.  For example, references to the word 
“chairman” have been changed to “chair” and male-gendered pronouns have 
been replaced by articles or by repetition of the antecedent noun.67 
 
 58. JAN VENOLIA, WRITE RIGHT!  A DESK DRAWER DIGEST OF PUNCTUATION, GRAMMAR & STYLE 
66 (1979). 
 59. Id. 
 60. MILLER & SWIFT, supra note 43, at 2. 
 61. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY vii (2d ed. 1999) (The second edition 
was originally published in 1987). 
 62. Id. 
 63. THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE, supra note 43, at 602.  In 
dictionaries, the “most frequently encountered meanings generally come before less common ones.”  
Id. at xviii. 
 64. Id. 
 65. THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 32; see also id. at 157, 167. 
 66. See Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, http://www.house.gov/pelosi/biography/bio.html 
(last visited October 14, 2009) (On January 4, 2007, Nancy Pelosi was elected Speaker of the United 
States House of Representatives.). 
 67. H.R. Res. 5, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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B.   Trends in Legal Writing 
While some style mavens were struggling with the changes in language, 
legal writers in 1979 could turn to Richard Wydick’s Plain English for Lawyers, 
which introduced a section on “Sexism in Legal Writing” with the admonition 
that “[t]he time has passed when legal writers can pretend that the world is 
inhabited by males only.”68  Wydick then provided two pages of gender-neutral 
alternatives.69 
Today, most legal writing texts and manuals continue to recommend the 
use of gender-neutral language and list techniques to achieve it.70  Although the 
authors agree on the general principles, some include the caveat that gender 
neutrality should be sacrificed if the result is awkward or distracting.71 
Despite the failure of many law students, lawyers, and judges to follow the 
advice contained in these books,72 the legal world has seen some movement in 
the direction of gender-neutral writing.  For example, the change from 
“reasonable man” to “reasonable person” as a legal standard is an obvious, 
notable change in legal terminology.73  Numerous law journals now encourage 
authors to use gender-neutral language74 and a number of states have made 
 
 68. RICHARD WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS 59 (1979). 
 69. Id. at 60–61. 
 70. See, e.g., ENQUIST & OATES, supra note 11, at 148–52; GARNER, supra note 19, at 315–17; 
EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 281; SHAPO, WALTER & FAJANS, supra note 21, at 244–46 (“The legal 
profession has become increasingly sensitive to the use of sexist language.  To avoid antagonizing 
colleagues and clients, it is important to use gender neutral language when you write.”); RICHARD K. 
NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING  233–35 (6th ed. 2009); MICHAEL D. MURRAY 
& CHRISTY H. DESANCTIS, LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 174 (2005) (“There is no excuse for writing 
with sexist, male-dominated language in legal contexts.”) 
 71. See, e.g., BOUCHOUX, supra note 36, at 25 (“[I]t is still acceptable to use he or him when 
changing the pronouns or rewriting the sentence would result in clumsy and distracting writing.”) 
 72. See supra note 12. 
 73. See Chew & Kelly-Chew, supra note 13, at 672–74 (2007) (reviewing the history of the change 
from “reasonable man” to “reasonable person” in the legal community). 
 74. See, e.g., Brooklyn Journal of International Law, http://www.brooklaw.edu/ 
students/journals/bjilsubmission.php (“The Journal encourages the use of gender-neutral 
language.”); Capital University Law Review, https://culsnet.law.capital.edu/LawReview/ 
Submit.asp; Columbia Law Review, http://www.columbialawreview.org/information/submissions 
(“The Review encourages the use of gender-neutral language.”); Cornell Law Review, http:// 
www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/Submissions.cfm 
(“We encourage the use of gender-neutral language.”); Gonzaga Law Review, http:// 
www.law.gonzaga.edu/Academic-Program/Law-Reviews/gonzaga_law_review/default.asp (“It is 
the policy of the Gonzaga Law Review to support and further the use of gender-neutral language.”); 
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review, http://elr.lls.edu/submissions.html (“As a 
matter of policy, the Journal encourages and promotes the use of gender-neutral writing.”); 
Michigan State University Journal of Medicine and Law, https://www.msu.edu/~msujml/ 
submission.html (“The use of gender-neutral language is preferred.”); New York Law School Law 
Review, http://www.nyls.edu/academics/jd_programs/law_review/submissions_policy/ (“As a 
matter of policy, the New York Law School Law Review encourages the use of gender-neutral 
language.”); Northwestern University Law Review, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
lawreview/submissions.html; Pennsylvania State Law Review, http://www.dsl.psu.edu/journals/ 
lawreview/submission.cfm; Stetson University College of the Law, http://justice.law.stetson.edu/ 
lawrev/submittingarticles.asp (“As a matter of policy, the Stetson Law Review encourages the use of 
gender-neutral and race-neutral language.”); Southwestern Law School, http://www.swlaw.edu/ 
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their jury instructions gender neutral.75  In addition, many state court style 
manuals advise attorneys to use gender-neutral language.76 
 
academics/biederman/journal/articlesubmissions (“The writing should be appropriate for a law 
review article.  To that end, authors should [sic] [u]se gender-neutral language.”); Villanova Law 
Review, http://www.law.villanova.edu/scholarlyresources/journals/lawreview/submitting 
articles.asp (all websites last visited on October 14, 2009). 
 75. See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 2.1058 (2009), available at http:// 
www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/index.cfm?title=two&linkid=rule2_1058 (“All instructions submitted 
to the jury must be written in gender-neutral language.  If standard jury instructions (CALCRIM and 
CACI) are to be submitted to the jury, the court or, at the court's request, counsel must recast the 
instructions as necessary to ensure that gender-neutral language is used in each instruction."); State 
of Connecticut Judicial Branch, Criminal Jury Instructions (2001), available at http:// 
www.jud.ct.gov/JI/criminal/aboutedition.htm (“The statutory language has been altered for 
gender neutrality.”); Maryland State Bar Association, Inc., Standing Committee on Pattern Jury 
Instructions, Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions (2006), available at http:// 
www.micpel.edu/Catalog/publications/tables%20of%20contents/Maryland%20Criminal%20Patter
n%20Jury%20Instructions.htm (“The instructions are gender neutral and should be presented to 
reflect the applicable gender.”); STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN, STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN TASK FORCE ON 
RACIAL/ETHNIC AND GENDER ISSUES IN THE COURTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 8 (1997), available at http://courts.michigan.gov/mji/webcast/alimony/ 
execsummary.pdf (“As a result of recommendations by the State Bar of Michigan Standing 
Committee on Standard Criminal Jury Instructions and the Michigan Supreme Court Standard Jury 
Instructions Committee, civil and criminal jury instructions were amended to adopt consistently 
gender neutral language in almost all provisions and commentary.”); NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED 
COURT SYSTEM, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2D (2001), available at http:// 
www.courts.state.ny.us/cji/0-TitlePage/History.htm (“The statutory definitions and other portions 
of the charge have been made gender-neutral with statutory language altered as necessary.”). 
 76. See, e.g., ARKANSAS JUDICIARY, STYLE AND USAGE GUIDE 20 (2008), available at http:// 
courts.state.ar.us/reporter_decisions/house_style_guide/jan2008_rev3.pdf (“Whenever possible, 
use gender-neutral language.  This principle has been recognized legislatively, with the term 
‘workers’ compensation’ replacing ‘workmen’s compensation.’  Analogously, use ‘firefighter’ 
instead of 'fireman.' When dealing with generic pronouns, unless the context specifically calls for 
gender distinction, use ‘he or she’ and ‘his or hers.’  The locution is obviously cumbersome, but it’s 
the best inclusive form available – until ‘their’ becomes an acceptable alternative in formal writing.  
Bryan A. Garner offers some helpful suggestions, such as using ‘one’ or ‘who,’ in The Elements of 
Legal Style, 7.17 (Oxford University Press, 1991).”); JESSEN, supra note 31, at 174–75 ("When writing 
in general terms, use gender-neutral language.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 989.)  This requires 
awareness that not all judges, lawyers, parties or witnesses are male and avoidance of 'he' as a 
generic pronoun."); COLORADO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE LEGAL SERVICE, COLORADO LEGISLATIVE 
DRAFTING MANUAL 11-5 to 11-10 (2008) http://www.state.co.us/gov_dir/ 
leg_dir/olls/LDM/OLLS_Drafting_Manual.pdf; LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, MAINE STATE LEGISLATURE, 
MAINE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL 83-89 (2004), http://janus.state.me.us/legis/ 
ros/manual/Draftman2004.pdf; OFFICE OF THE REVISOR OF STATUTES, MINNESOTA RULES: DRAFTING 
MANUAL WITH STYLES AND FORMS 269 (2002) https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/revisor/ 
pubs/bill_drafting_manual/revisor_manual.pdf (“There are many ways to avoid gender-specific 
nouns like workman or man-hours.  The revisor's office has some standard substitutions developed 
for use during the gender project of 1986, which  removed gender-specific language from the 
statutes.  Other useful lists appear in The Nonsexist Word Finder by Rosalie Maggio.”); Oregon 
Appellate Courts, Style Manual 14-15 (2002), http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/ 
Style%20Manual%202002.pdf (“Gender-neutral terms are preferred, and gender-based pronouns are 
avoided except when referring to a specific person.  Use ‘he or she’ only when all other constructions 
fail.”); TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL DRAFTING MANUAL 103 (2008), 
http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/legal/dm/draftingmanual.pdf (“The use of masculine pronouns is 
subject to criticism as an example of sex bias, and for that reason gender-neutral language is 
preferred in drafts of legislative documents.”) (all websites last visited on April 8, 2009). 
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Two recent studies have specifically addressed the use of gender-neutral 
language in the legal profession.  Pat Chew and Lauren Kelley-Chew evaluated 
the written work of judges, lawyers, and legal scholars by comparing the use of 
gendered nouns during the period between 2004 and 2006 with the period 
between 1994 and 1996.77  They found a lack of “significant change” between the 
two periods,78 but noted “a small but positive movement toward the use of 
gender-neutral words in the last decade” by judges and lawyers.79  In contrast, 
Judith Fischer’s study of the use of gender-neutral language in federal appellate 
opinions demonstrated a “dramatic increase” in the use of gender-neutral 
language between 1965 and 2006.80 
C.  Criticisms of Gender-Neutral Language 
The movement toward gender-neutral language is not without detractors.81  
Some critics believe that the issue is too trivial to warrant the effort required to 
change writing habits they see as rooted in tradition.82  For example, a 1998 
study found that up to eighty percent of the students surveyed supported 
“changing some aspects of sexist language,” but up to fifty-three percent “were 
still resistant to changing at least parts of the language.”  Their resistance was 
reportedly based on “the difficulty of change for the individual and the 
pervasive influence of perceived tradition in society.”83 
Critics in the legal writing world have expressed concern that the 
elimination of the masculine generic pronoun would have a negative impact on 
writing style and readability.84  Justice Scalia, in particular, has opined that the 
elimination of “he” as a “traditional, generic, unisex reference to a human 
being” is both distracting and comes with “some stylistic cost.”85 
Others see any movement to change language that offends some group as 
“politically correct” and ultimately ineffective in achieving underlying societal 
 
 77. Supra note 13, at 659 (The authors searched Westlaw databases looking for the frequency of 
use of specific male-gendered generics (e.g. “congressman,” “businessman”) compared to the use of 
gender-neutral alternatives (e.g., “congressperson,” “businessperson”).). 
 78. Id. at 663. 
 79. Id. at 667. 
 80. Fischer, supra note 14, at 502 (The author searched a “large sample” for paired pronouns and 
studied a smaller sample in which complete opinions were reviewed and all uses of gender-biased 
and gender-neutral language were recorded.). 
 81. See, e.g., Janet B. Parks & Mary Ann Roberton, Contemporary Arguments Against Nonsexist 
Language: Blaubergs (1980) Revisited, 39 SEX ROLES 445 (1998); Chew & Kelly-Chew, supra note 13, at 
669–72 (2007) (discussing obstacles to pervasive change). 
 82. See Parks & Roberton, supra note 81, at 447–48; Mucchi-Faina, supra note 38, at 193–94 (2005). 
 83. Parks & Roberton, supra note 81, at 459 (The authors surveyed undergraduates in sport 
management classes at a "midsize, politically-conservative university in the Midwest."). 
 84. See, e.g., Cathy J. Jones, Sexist Language: An Overview for Teachers and Librarians, 82 LAW 
LIBRARY JOURNAL 673, 677-78 (Fall 1990) (responding to criticism that nonsexist language is 
awkward: "At first, using alternative language might seem awkward, but once one gets used to 
hearing nonsexist language, the use of, for example, only masculine pronouns is not only awkward, 
but deafening."). 
 85. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 119. 
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change.86  For example, in the foreword to a new editing guide for lawyers, the 
author explained why she chose to use alternating pronouns throughout the 
book: 
An aside about sexist pronouns: The fracas over how to avoid favoritism has 
gone on for some time, and, apart from such efficient (and perhaps ephemeral) 
unisex inventions as s/he or the constraining cop-out of using only plurals, it 
appears to remain unresolved.  How to deal with the issue is, to my mind, a 
matter of taste; our choice of pronouns is not what enslaves women or keeps 
men oblivious to the offense of the omnipresent “he.”87 
The criticisms of gender-neutral language are encapsulated in a brief 
exchange between an author and the student editors of the Georgetown Law 
Journal.  In 1994, the Journal published a letter from Steven Shavell, an article 
author who objected to the Journal’s policy against male-gendered generics.88  
Professor Shavell listed three objections to gender-neutral language he 
considered “obvious”: 1) the writing would be “stilted and unnatural, upsetting 
to our aesthetic sensibilities (which have been molded by use of the male 
pronoun forms in our language and literature)”; 2) the writer might not want to 
“be associated with” the “particular political connotation” that the use of 
gender-neutral language carries; and, most importantly, 3) freedom of 
expression would be compromised, resulting in “a flow of work that is reduced 
and distorted in content, and a situation rife with opportunity for abuse by those 
with censorial authority.”89 
As the editors pointed out in their response to Professor Shavell, the use of 
male-gendered generics is not neutral; it can communicate its own political 
connotations90 and may indeed upset the “aesthetic sensibilities” of a significant 
portion of the audience.91  In fact, Professor Shavell need not have feared 
censorship; his article was published as he wished, with the inclusion of male-
gendered generics.92  The Journal “encouraged” authors to use gender-neutral 
language; it did not mandate the practice.93 
As discussed above, a number of alternatives are available to writers who 
wish to avoid masculine generics.  While these techniques take some thought, 
 
 86. See, e.g., Gertrude Block, Writing Tips: Views on PC, 18 PENNSYLVANIA LAWYER 58 (1996) 
“[A]fter more than two decades of the ‘de-sexing’ of our language, women are still paid less for 
similar jobs than men, are still under-represented in ‘power’ positions in both academia and in 
business.  Sex discrimination has been dealt with more successfully by law than by language.”  Block 
concludes that changes in attitude do not automatically result from changes in how we refer to 
people: “The burden rests on the speakers of the language to change their attitudes, not on the 
language itself.”  See also CURZAN, supra note 17, at 182–84 (discussing the arguments against a ballot 
proposition that amended the Seattle City Charter “so that all exclusively male gender references 
would be replaced with gender-neutral references.”) 
 87. MAGAT, supra note 34, at xi. 
 88. Steven Shavell, Comment, 82 GEO. L.J. 1777, 1777–78 (1994). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Comment: From the Editor, 82 GEO. L.J. 1779, 1779 (1994).  See infra, Section III.A. 
 91. Shavell, supra note 88, at 1777–78. 
 92. Comment: From the Editor, supra note 90, at 1779. 
 93. Id.  Many law journals “encourage,” but do not require, authors to use gender-neutral 
language.  See supra Section II.B. 
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they are no more difficult than the many adjustments writers must make in 
order to be understood.94 
As discussed in the next section, the use of gender-neutral language in legal 
writing can contribute to clarity and reduce distraction, if handled with care.  
While it is not the cure for sex discrimination, language can have a substantial 
impact on the reader.  As Professor Cathy Jones has pointed out, this issue is 
more than trivial because communication is central to the legal profession and 
“[n]o profession is more reliant on precision in language than law.”95 
III. WHY GENDER-NEUTRAL LANGUAGE MATTERS 
The greatest difficulty in planning any change in a language is demonstrating a 
need in order to gain the acceptance of the people who use that language.96 
The use of gendered generics can communicate subtle sexism, distract, and 
create ambiguity.97  These problems are particularly an issue in judicial opinions 
because they are designed to be used; they communicate rules that must be 
understood and followed.  For the Supreme Court, gender-neutral language is 
additionally important because its opinions are so widely read, and they act as 
models of legal writing for law students. 
A.  Gendered Generics Can Communicate Subtle Sexism 
Language matters.  The use of only male pronouns may imply a world 
populated solely by men, or that certain roles or spheres are reserved solely for 
men or for women.  Women have long been excluded from the practice of law 
and the powerful positions within this discipline. . . .  Against the backdrop of 
this history, the use of only male pronouns is not a neutral exercise; rather, it is a 
political choice. 98 
The consistent use of male-gendered generics to represent all people can 
have a psychological impact on women by making them feel excluded and by 
reinforcing traditional gender stereotypes – even when that effect is not 
intended.99  Social science research demonstrates that language is a social force 
 
 94. For example, in its “Guidelines to Reduce Bias in Language,” the American Psychological 
Association advises writers: “Just as you have learned to check what you write for spelling, 
grammar, and wordiness, practice reading over your work for bias.”  Supra note 37, at 61–62. 
 95. Jones, supra note 84, at 675.  See also Abrahamson, supra note 15, at 1216–17 (arguing that the 
use of male-gendered generics in the judicial system is “not a trivial matter” because “the law is such 
a verbal profession.”). 
 96. Janet A. Sniezek & Christine H. Jazwinksi, Gender Bias in English: In Search of Fair Language, 
16 JOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 660 (1986). 
 97. Some feminist language reformers believe that the primary, if not the only, reason for 
change is based on "political and ideological preferences" rather than on the reformed language 
being "more accurate, more precise": "We should therefore be honest enough to defend our 
tampering not in terms of its purported linguistic merits, but in terms of its political utility for 
raising consciousness, denouncing sexism and empowering women."  CURZAN, supra note 17, at 187 
(quoting DEBORAH CAMERON, FEMINISM AND LINGUISTIC THEORY 125 (2d ed. 1990)). 
 98. From the Editor, supra note 90, at 1779 (responding to Professor Steven Shavell’s complaint 
about the journal’s policy encouraging the use of gender-neutral language). 
 99. Chew & Kelly-Chew, supra note 13, at 650.  See also Mucchi-Faina, supra note 38, at 208 
(“Research also strongly confirmed that use of the masculine generic supports male-biased imagery, 
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that can have an impact on how women view themselves and are viewed by 
others.  In particular, the “linguistic relativity hypothesis” claims that “culture 
and language are intertwined and that the words that people use affect the way 
they see both the world and their self-concept.”100 
Contrary to the argument that “he” includes all people, researchers have 
found that male-gendered words actually conjure male images.101  For example, 
a 1996 study showed that when an occupation’s title was male (“city 
councilman”), people were more likely to describe the “average person” in the 
occupation as male.102  In legal writing, while we might not find this male 
association objectionable when the antecedent is a generic criminal defendant,103 
it creates a problem when the antecedent is, for example, a federal district 
judge.104 
Other studies confirm that the use of masculine generics has negative 
effects.105  For example, a 1986 study concluded that generic masculine terms, 
even when intended to refer to all people, operate in practice to apply only to 
males.106  The authors of this study were concerned that their findings indicated 
that male-gendered generics could negatively impact women “during the 
recruitment and hiring process in a male-dominated organization” and deter 
them from entering certain fields.107 
These concepts are applicable to the legal field.  For example, when the 
authors of Supreme Court opinions continually use male generics to refer to 
lawyers, legislators, judges, political candidates, and property owners,108 the 
 
favours overestimation of male presence in the context and leads to interpreting the personality of 
the target of an occupational title as more masculine.”). 
 100. Chew & Kelly-Chew, supra note 13, at 644 n.3.  See also Sniezek & Jazwinksi, supra note 96, at 
659 ("Sex-biased language is perhaps a consequence as well as [a]cause of sex-biased culture.") 
(citing BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY 252 (1956)).  At least one researcher 
has concluded that linguistic-relativity is irrelevant: “[S]exist language should be changed simply 
because it is sexist.”  Parks & Roberton, supra note 81, at 445–46 (citing M. Blaubergs, An analysis of 
classic arguments against changing sexist language, 3 WOMEN’S STUDIES INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY 
135-47 (1980)). 
 101. See, e.g., John Gastil, Generic Pronouns and Sexist Language: The Oxymoronic Character of 
Masculine Generics, 23 SEX ROLES 629, 638-40 (1990).  Gastil asked male and female undergraduates to 
report images conjured by sentences that included the pronouns "he," “he/she," and "they."  The 
results showed that "he" was the least generic pronoun and that for men, "they" is more generic than 
"he/she"; Sniezek & Jazwinksi, supra note 96, at 653, 659.  See also Chew & Kelly-Chew, supra note 13, 
at 649–50 and studies cited therein. 
 102. Chew & Kelly-Chew, supra note 13, at 649–50.  See Sniezek & Jazwinksi, supra note 96, at 
644–45 ("[T]he results of the few studies available provide some support for the hypothesis that 
generic masculine nouns and pronouns are, in fact, used to mean men, even though the grammatical 
form of a given sentence suggests the inclusion of women."). 
 103. See, e.g., Greenlaw v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2559, 2569 (2008) (“In a criminal prosecution, 
moreover, the defendant would appeal at his peril, with nothing to alert him that, on his own 
appeal, his sentence would be increased.”). 
 104. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007) (“[A] district judge must give serious 
consideration to the extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must explain his conclusion.”). 
 105. See Mucchi-Faina, supra note 38, at 205. 
 106. Sniezek & Jazwinksi, supra note 96, at 659. 
 107. Id. at 660. 
 108. See examples cited in Section IV. 
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subtle sexism is that these are jobs usually held by men.  The subtlety of such 
sexism does not prevent it from being harmful.109 
The harm of subtle sexism can be seen in the annual statistics compiled by 
the American Bar Association Commission on Women in the Profession, which 
show that, while the status of women in the legal profession has improved, 
equality remains elusive.  The most recent studies show that women still lag 
behind in pay and status.  While more than half of all law school graduates are 
women, these numbers are not reflected in the ranks of the judiciary, in 
Congress, in tenured professorships, or in law firm partnerships.110  In 2009, The 
American Lawyer magazine released a study demonstrating that “while the ranks 
of female partners have grown steadily, women still account, on average, for 
fewer than one in five big-firm partners.”111  The numbers for women with elite 
academic credentials are not necessarily better.  For example, during the 2006 
Supreme Court Term, only seven out of thirty-seven law clerks were women.112  
In addition, the number of women whose work is published in the law journals 
of the top-ranked schools is disproportionately low.113 
While there may not be a direct line of causation between the language 
used in court opinions and the disappointing statistics for women in the 
profession, language can be seen as a piece in a larger puzzle.  For example, 
Chew and Kelley-Chew have concluded that the continued use of subtly sexist 
language in the legal community “effectively reinforces our acceptance of its 
debilitating messages about women,”114 which can result in “very real and 
damaging effects”: 
Employers and clients may be less likely to see women as successful 
professionals assuming leadership roles.  Faculty and classmates may be less 
likely to see women as worthy law students and future lawyers.  Women 
themselves may begin to believe the underlying message that there is a 
mismatch between who they are and their chosen career path.  Likewise, women 
may internalize the idea that they are not capable law students, lawyers, faculty 
or judges.115 
Ultimately, as linguist Anne Curzan has noted, we do not know if 
“changing language eventually changes attitudes.”  We do know, however, that 
 
 109. Chew & Kelly-Chew, supra note 13, at 653. 
 110. See, e.g., American Bar Association Commission on Women in the Profession, A Current 
Glance at Women in the Law 2008, available at http://www.abanet.org/women/ 
CurrentGlanceStatistics2008.pdf (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 111. Emily Barker, Stuck in the Middle, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (June 2, 2009), available at 
http://americanlawyer.com (The study of 210 firms concluded that "the mean proportion of women 
at large firms has remained close to about one-third.”). 
 112. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Memo: Women Suddenly Scarce Among Justices’ Clerks, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2006 at A18.  Justices Thomas, Souter, Alito, and Scalia hired no women clerks 
during this term; Justices Stevens, Roberts, and Kennedy each hired one; and Justices Breyer and 
Ginsburg each hired two. 
 113. This underrepresentation has been chronicled in a continuing series titled “Where Are the 
Women?” on the Feminist Law Professors blog.  See http://feministlawprofessors.com/ 
?s=where+are+the+women%3F (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 114. Supra note 13, at 675. 
 115. Id. at 676. 
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language can “reflect social structures and attitudes” and may indeed 
perpetuate them.  Raising awareness “force[s] speakers to consider how their 
audience may perceive certain linguistic choices.  And when speakers use less, 
for example, sexist language, then the language is arguably not perpetuating 
sexist attitudes.”116 
B.  Gendered Generics Can Distract the Reader 
All writers, particularly legal writers, are taught to consider the audience.  
Modern writing texts, particularly those directed at law students, have refined 
this concept to focus on writing with the expectations and the needs of the 
reader as a guiding principle.117  A part of this theme is to strive to keep the 
reader focused on the writer’s intended message, rather than distracted by other 
matters.  Thus, because some readers find gendered generics distracting,118 they 
should be avoided.  As Bryan Garner has noted, “it is unacceptable to a great 
many reasonable readers to use the generic masculine pronoun,” and its use can 
cause the writer to lose credibility with some readers.119  Gender-neutral writing 
represents “an instance of adopting a convention to avoid distracting 
readers.”120 
A key part of modern legal writing courses is conveying to students the 
importance of professionalism—part of a larger trend that applies to legal 
education as a whole.121  Professionalism includes rigorous compliance with 
rules pertaining to format, style, and citation.122  Professional competence also 
includes sensitivity to cultural stereotypes and awareness of language that will 
be offensive, and therefore distracting, to some members of the writer’s 
audience.123  For example, at Seattle University School of Law, Professors 
Lorraine Bannai and Anne Enquist teach their legal writing students to 
recognize “how bias may be embedded in language” because this skill “is 
 
 116. CURZAN, supra note 17, at 180. 
 117. See, e.g., GEORGE GOPEN, EXPECTATIONS: TEACHING WRITING FROM THE READER'S 
PERSPECTIVE xiv (2004) (explaining a pragmatic approach to writing that values communication over 
self-expression); EDWARDS, supra note 19, at 69–75 (advising law students to focus on the needs of the 
"law-trained readers" with whom they must communicate); MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL 
GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 3–4 (2d ed. 2006) (urging law students to "produce a document that 
can be understood by a busy reader the first time through."). 
 118. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, A Brief for Gender-Neutral Brief Writing, N.Y.L.J., March 21, 1999, at 2. 
 119. THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 32.  The section on “Grammar and Usage” was 
authored by Bryan Garner, who advocates “invisible gender neutrality,” including composing a 
sentence in a way that “eliminate[s] the need for any personal pronoun at all,” id. at 157, replacing 
the personal pronoun with “its,” id. at 160, and replacing the pronoun with an article, id. at 167. 
 120. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 116.  Although Justice Scalia coauthored the book, he 
disagrees with Garner on this point.  See id. at 119. 
 121. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION 
OF LAW 14 (2007) (“[P]rofessionalism needs to become more explicit and better diffused throughout 
legal preparation.”). 
 122. See Judith D. Fischer, Bareheaded and Barefaced Counsel: Courts React to Unprofessionalism in 
Lawyers’ Papers, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 20, 30–32 (1997) (discussing examples of unprofessional 
conduct, including poor style, citation errors, and breach of court rules). 
 123. See Lorraine Bannai & Anne Enquist, (Un)Examined Assumptions and (Un)Intended Messages: 
Teaching Students to Recognize Bias in Legal Analysis and Language, 27 SEATTLE UNIV. L. R. 1, 33 (2003). 
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simply part of being an effective lawyer.”124  This skill is also part of being an 
effective judge.125 
C. Gendered Generics Can Create Ambiguity 
What many people find hardest to accept is that a word which used to mean one 
thing now means another, and that continuing to use it in its former sense – no 
matter how impeccable its etymological credentials – can only invite 
misunderstanding.126 
Clarity is one of the hallmarks of the plain English movement that informs 
much of modern legal writing education.127  In addition to stressing clarity, legal 
writing manuals also emphasize precision.128  The use of gendered generics in 
legal writing is neither clear nor precise.  The use of the word “man,” for 
example, is ambiguous because it can be used to refer to a specific adult male or 
to human beings generally, both male and female.129  When a writer uses the 
word generically, alone or as part of a compound (e.g., chairman, salesman), the 
reader may misinterpret the writer’s meaning.130  As Miller and Swift have 
noted “[a]nyone who chooses to use man in its old, generic sense can claim 
centuries of precedent.  But even centuries of precedent crumble if those on the 
receiving end hear a different meaning from the one intended.”131 
The ambiguity created by the use of gendered generics can be particularly 
troublesome in judicial opinions.  The reader may not always be able to 
determine if a particular passage refers generally to men and women, generally 
to all men, or specifically to a party in the case.  A case in point is Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, in which the Court held that a Louisiana statute authorizing the death 
penalty for the rape of a child younger than twelve violated the Eighth 
 
 124. Id. at 39. 
 125. See generally Abrahamson, supra note 15. 
 126. MILLER & SWIFT, supra note 7, at 6–7. 
 127. See WYDICK, supra note 11, at 3–4; BRYAN GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH xiv 
(2001) (“You achieve plain English when you use the simplest, most straightforward way of 
expressing an idea.”). 
 128. See, e.g., CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 265 (5th ed. 2006) (“[Y]ou 
must select the words and phrases that precisely convey your intended meaning.”). 
 129. See, e.g., RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1166 (1998) (“MAN 1.  an 
adult male person, as distinguished from a boy or a woman.  2. a member of the species Homo sapiens 
or all the members of this species collectively, without regard to sex: prehistoric man.  3. the human 
individual as representing the species, without reference to sex; the human race; humankind: Man 
hopes for peace, but prepares for war.  4. a human being; person: to give a man a chance; When the audience 
smelled the smoke, it was every man for himself.”).  Id. at 879 (HE: “1. the male person or animal being 
discussed or last mentioned; that male.  2. anyone (without reference to sex); that person: He who 
hesitates is lost.”). 
 130. See Sniezek & Jazwinksi, supra note 96, at 644 ("Just because speakers and writers use a 
masculine noun or pronoun generically does not imply that listeners and readers interpret it that 
way.").  See also RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, supra note 129 (“Critics of the 
use of MAN as a generic maintain that it is sometimes ambiguous when the wider sense is 
intended.”); PUBLICATION MANUAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 29, 
at 66 (“The use of man as a generic noun or as an ending for an occupational title (e.g., policeman) can 
be ambiguous and may imply incorrectly that all persons in the group are male.”). 
 131. MILLER & SWIFT, supra note 43, at 25. 
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Amendment.132  In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy alternated gendered 
pronouns, using a female generic for a rape victim and a male generic for a 
perpetrator: 
[C]hild rape cases present heightened concerns because the central narrative and 
account of the crime often comes from the child herself.  She and the accused 
are, in most instances, the only ones present when the crime was committed.133 
In most cases justice is not better served by terminating the life of the 
perpetrator rather than confining him and preserving the possibility that he and 
the system will find ways to allow him to understand the enormity of his 
offense.134  
 
Both statements are phrased in a way that implies they are meant to apply 
generally, rather than just specifically to this case.  However, the language used 
gives the misleading impression that only female children are raped and only 
men can be perpetrators, or that the Louisiana statute at issue was drafted to 
limit its applicability in this way.135 
If gender-neutral writing were the norm, then a reader could assume more 
dependably that gendered nouns and pronouns had a specific purpose and 
meaning in an opinion.  Justice Alito’s dissent in Kennedy demonstrates that 
gender-neutral language can be both precise and powerful: 
The Court today holds that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the 
imposition of the death penalty for the crime of raping a child.  This is so, 
according to the Court, no matter how young the child, no matter how many 
times the child is raped, no matter how many children the perpetrator rapes, no 
matter how sadistic the crime, no matter how much physical or psychological 
trauma is inflicted, and no matter how heinous the perpetrator’s prior criminal 
record may be.136  
In this example, Alito used the gender-neutral technique of repeating the 
noun, instead of using a pronoun. 
D.  How a Judicial Opinion is Written Matters 
[J]udges . . . are professional writers.  . . . [W]hat we write is as important as 
what we decide.  This is so because a judge’s opinion performs as well as 
explains.137 
Most legal writing books are designed to help law students and attorneys 
communicate effectively and persuasively.  Judges are also legal writers, and 
 
 132. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008). 
 133. Id. at 2663. 
 134. Id. at 2665. 
 135. The statute at issue was not limited by gender.  It used the nouns “victim” and “offender” 
and included no pronouns.  See La. Stat. Ann. § 14.42 (West 2007). 
 136. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2665 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 137. ALDISERT, supra note 12, at v (1990). 
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they have an even greater responsibility to communicate effectively138 because 
their opinions are more widely read and have greater impact than an individual 
memo, brief, or motion.  Books and articles directed at judges, for the most part, 
advocate for gender-neutral language.139 
Judicial opinions, for better or for worse, provide law students with models 
of legal writing practices.  “If judges write in a particular way, then students will 
take their cues from that style in crafting their own writing.  . . . Because law 
students must learn a new way of thinking, they seek examples of what it means 
to think, speak, and write like a lawyer.”140 
The most prominent institution in the legal community is the Supreme 
Court.  Its opinions constitute the most widely read examples of legal writing.  
In recent interviews conducted by Bryan Garner, several justices acknowledged 
their responsibility to make their opinions accessible to a broader audience 
beyond the legal community.141  Ultimately, if the Supreme Court consistently 
used gender-neutral language in all its opinions, that usage would soon become 
the norm.142 
To avoid subtle sexism, distraction, and ambiguity, all legal writing should 
be gender neutral.  The most influential members of the profession should set 
the standard.  As the results below demonstrate, as a group, they do not. 
IV.  RESEARCH RESULTS 
A.  Method 
To assess each justice’s use of gender-neutral language, more than 105 cases 
were reviewed from the 2006, 2007, and 2008 terms.143  By examining three 
different terms, this study attempted to get a sense of the patterns in the current 
 
 138. See generally Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa Solomon, Ethical Opinion Writing, 21 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 248 (2008) ("For judges, words are critical."). 
 139. See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 12, at 417–22 (noting that certain nouns can exclude women and 
encouraging judges to use gender-neutral language alternatives, when available, for occupational 
titles, but finding fault with most of the alternatives to the gendered personal pronoun); ALDISERT, 
supra note 12, at 234–37 (reprinting several sections of the "Guidelines for Equal Treatment of the 
Sexes," developed by McGraw-Hill Book Company Publications in 1974; the complete guidelines are 
available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/ 
80/38/0b/b4.pdf). 
 140. Lebovits, Curtin & Solomon, supra note 138, at 254. 
 141. See The Supreme Court – Kennedy Interview, Part I (In his interview, Justice Kennedy noted 
that judges should be good writers “because they are widely read.”).  All members of the Roberts 
Court were interviewed except for Justice Souter.  The videotaped interviews can be viewed at 
http://www.lawprose.org/interviews/supreme_court.php (last visited July 18, 2009).  See also 
Thomas Interview, Part 1 (Justice Thomas commented that the Court’s opinions should be 
“accessible to nonlawyers” because the Constitution is not a document for lawyers); Ginsburg 
Interview, Part 2 and Alito Interview, Part 1. 
 142. See Chew & Kelly-Chew, supra note 13, at 671–72. 
 143. The 2008 Term refers to Supreme Court decisions issued between October 2008 and June 
2009; the 2007 Term refers to decisions issued between October 2007 and June 2008; the 2006 Term 
refers to decisions issued between October 2006 and June 2007.  The 2006 Term was Justice Alito’s 
first full term on the Court. 
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writing of each of the justices, and to balance out any change that might be 
influenced by a particular law clerk.144 
A minimum of fifteen opinions of each justice were examined, including 
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.  For each justice, at least twelve 
opinions revealed something relevant about his or her use of language.145  The 
study focused on the following factors: 1) the generic use of gender-specific 
pronouns; 2) the use of gendered nouns to describe an occupation or title that 
could be occupied by a man or a woman; and 3) the use of gender-neutral 
techniques, both obvious and subtle, to avoid both 1 and 2.  Examples of 
gendered or gender-neutral language that were part of a direct quotation from 
another source were not included.  All the justices retained gendered generics in 
such instances.146 
The examples provided are limited to general statements that were truly 
generic – meant to apply to all persons, male and female.  Statements that were 
not clearly generic were not included. 
This study provides examples in which justices have used gender-neutral 
techniques to demonstrate that writing in this way is doable and that the results 
are as readable, if not more readable, than a gender-specific version.  Cases with 
multiple opinions provided opportunities to compare styles and to demonstrate 
that avoiding gendered generics can enhance effective communication. 
B.  Overview of Results 
The Court as a whole presents a mixed picture.  It does very well in some 
areas, particularly in the use of gendered nouns.  It is setting the standard for the 
legal profession by using gender-neutral terms, for the most part, for 
 
 144. It is generally accepted that law clerks help the justices draft their opinions.  See RICHARD A. 
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 294 (2008); Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on 
Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL LAW REV. 51, 56-57 (2008).  
However, Judge Posner has acknowledged that, even though some judges may delegate opinion-
writing, the law clerks prepare by reading prior opinions “and then model their own style on that of 
the opinions they read."  Richard Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1421, 1425 (1995).  Jeffrey Toobin has warned that "it is easy to overstate the importance of law 
clerks."  See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 317 (2007). 
 145. A number of cases did not reveal any clear information about the use of gender-neutral 
language or gendered generics because the parties were corporations, businesses, or governments, 
and so the authors did not have occasion to use singular pronouns.  See, e.g., Florida Dept. of 
Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2326 (2008) (interpreting stamp-tax exemption in the 
Bankruptcy Code); Limtiaco v. Camacho, 549 U.S. 483 (2007) (interpreting the meaning of “tax 
valuation” for the purpose of calculating Guam’s debt limitation); Permanent Mission of India v. 
City of New York, 551 U.S. 193 (2007) (determining applicability of Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act to tax lien on property used for diplomatic offices).  See also Fischer, supra note 14, at 499 
(acknowledging similar point in study of federal appellate opinions). 
 146. See GARNER, supra note 28, at 802–03 (“Statute of Limitations.  Those committed to nonsexist 
usage ought to adopt a statute of limitations that goes something like this: in quoted matter dating 
from before 1980, passages containing bland sexism–such as the use of the generic he or of chairman–
can be quoted in good conscience because in those days the notions of gender-inclusiveness were 
entirely different from today’s notions.  Although it is quite fair to discuss cultural changes over 
time, it is unfair to criticize our predecessors for not conforming to present-day standards.  How 
could they have done so?  Therefore, using “[sic]” at every turn to point out old sexist phrases is at 
best an otiose exercise, at worst a historically irresponsible example of mean-spiritedness.”) 
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occupational titles and other nouns, and by avoiding the generic use of “man” 
alone or as a compound.  For example, most justices consistently use the gender-
neutral terms “drafter,”147 “worker,”148 and “Members of Congress,”149 in place 
of their gendered counterparts, “draftsman,” “workman,” and “Congressman.” 
One justice clearly sits on one end of the spectrum while one justice is 
solidly on the other.  Justices Antonin Scalia and Samuel Alito, despite the 
similarities of their voting records,150 present opposing bookends, between 
which the rest of the justices fall on a continuum of sorts.  Most of the justices 
use gender-neutral language some of the time and gendered-generic language 
most of the time. 
The discussion that follows is organized around the three justices with the 
most identifiable and consistent styles.  Justice Alito leads the “setting the 
standard” category.  He consistently uses gender-neutral language and 
consistently avoids gendered generics.  Justice Scalia leads the “lagging behind” 
group.  He rarely uses gender-neutral language, consistently uses male-
gendered generics, and has publicly expressed his disdain for gender-neutral 
writing.151  Finally, Justice Ginsburg is “setting a different standard.”  Her 
selective use of alternating pronouns exhibits a unique consciousness of 
gendered language that is not strictly gender neutral. 
The remaining six justices are discussed in the category led by the justice to 
whom they are closest in their use of gender-neutral language, or based on the 
direction in which their writing style appears to be headed.  Thus, Justices 
Kennedy and Thomas are setting the standard; Justices Roberts, Souter, and 
Breyer are lagging behind; and Justice Stevens is setting a different standard.152 
Aside from Justice Ginsburg’s status as the lone woman on the court 
(during the three terms studied), there is no clear explanation for specific 
justices’ use of language.  Their writing styles cannot easily be explained by age 
(Alito and Roberts, the two youngest justices, both Baby Boomers, are in 
different categories), or by whether a particular justice is considered liberal or 
 
 147. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1089 (2009) (Ginsburg); Medellin v. Texas, 
128 S. Ct. 1346, 1381 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Hall St Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1406 
(2008) (Souter); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elect., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2117–18 (2008) (Thomas). 
 148. See, e.g., Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1102 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring & 
dissenting); 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1481, n.4 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting); Ky. Ret. 
Sys. v. EEOC, 128 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 149. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisc. Rt. to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2007) (Roberts); 
Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1567, n.5 (2009) (Souter); id. at 1575 (Alito, J., dissenting); 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2243, 2276 (2008) (Kennedy); Hein v. Freedom from Religion 
Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2552, 2566 (2007) (Alito); Zuni Public Sch. Dist. no. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 127 S. 
Ct. 1534, 1541 (2007) (Breyer); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 128 S. Ct. 761, 778–
79 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 150. See End of Term Statistical Analysis – Oct. Term 2008 (June 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/summary-memo-final.pdf, p. 4 
(last visited July 13, 2009).  The statistics from this term show that Justices Scalia and Alito voted 
together 87% of the time. 
 151. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 119. 
 152. In some respects, all the justices except Alito can be seen as “lagging behind” because they 
continue to use male-gendered generics.  It seemed useful, however, to acknowledge that some are 
further along the path than others.  Placing each justice in a category was not always an easy call and 
I recognize that some readers may disagree with my conclusions. 
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conservative.153  Souter and Stevens, both considered liberal, are in different 
categories.  Breyer and Ginsburg, both appointed by Democratic President Bill 
Clinton, are also in different categories. 
When a particular justice employs what could be described as an obvious 
gender-neutral technique, by pairing or alternating pronouns, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the writer intended to avoid gendered language.  On 
the other hand, when a particular justice uses invisible techniques, by 
pluralizing or repeating the antecedent noun, or by eliminating the need for a 
pronoun, it is not apparent whether the writer chose particular words to be 
inclusive, or just to write clearly.  However, the choices of Justices Alito, 
Scalia,154 and Ginsburg are sufficiently consistent to support the conclusion that 
their language is not accidental. 
C.  Setting the Standard 
1. Justice Samuel Alito 
Born in 1950,155 Justice Samuel Alito is one of the three members of the 
Baby Boom generation on the Court.  His father was a high school English 
teacher; his mother an elementary school teacher.156  He served in President 
Reagan’s Department of Justice where, according to Jeffrey Toobin, he was “the 
official constitutional adviser to the president and the unofficial ideological 
command center.”157  President George H. W. Bush nominated him to the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1990 and President George W. Bush nominated him 
to the Supreme Court in 2006.158  At the end of the 2008 Term, Adam Liptak 
wrote in the New York Times that Alito “may well now be the court’s most 
conservative member.”159 
Justice Alito avoids the use of gendered generics more consistently than 
any other member of the Court.  He employs a variety of gender-neutral 
techniques, including repeating the noun,160 pluralizing the noun,161 and using 
 
 153. See TOOBIN, supra note 144, at 327 (noting that Roberts, Alito, Scalia, and Thomas are 
considered “outspoken conservatives,” Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer are considered 
liberals, “by contemporary standards,” and that Kennedy is “in the middle”). 
 154. Scalia’s clear expression of his views about gender-neutral language, see SCALIA & GARNER, 
supra note 11, at 119, also supports the conclusion that his gendered writing style is intentional. 
 155. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 156. From Part I of an interview with Bryan Garner, available at http:// 
www.lawprose.org/interviews/supreme_court.php (last visited July 16, 2009).  In 2006-2007, Bryan 
Garner interviewed eight of the nine Justices about legal writing and advocacy. 
 157. TOOBIN, supra note 144, at 311. 
 158. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
about/biographiescurrent.pdf, (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 159. Supra note 5, at A1. 
 160. See, e.g., Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2246 (2009) (“[P]roof that a defendant 
conspired to commit a RICO predicate offense . . . does not necessarily establish that the defendant 
participated in the affairs of an arson enterprise.”); Corley, 129 S. Ct. at 1572 (Alito, J., dissenting); 
Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1764 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“If the IJ enters an order of 
removal, that order becomes final when the alien’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Board) is unsuccessful or the alien declines to appeal to the Board.”); Davis v. Fed. Election 
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paired pronouns,162 sometimes employing all three in one paragraph: “The 
principles of qualified immunity shield an officer from personal liability when 
an officer reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the law.  
Police officers are entitled to rely on existing lower court cases without facing 
personal liability for their actions.”163 
His consistent avoidance of gendered generics is notable in part for its 
marked contrast to other members of the Court.  For example, in his dissenting 
opinion in Gall v. United States, Justice Alito employed several gender-neutral 
techniques to avoid the gender-specific pronouns used by his colleagues.  In 
Gall, the Court held that the sentence imposed by the district court under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines was reasonable and that appellate courts should 
review all sentences under the Guidelines using an abuse of discretion 
standard.164  In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens used male-gendered 
generics in general statements about district judges165 and criminal 
defendants.166  In his brief concurring opinion, Justice Scalia also used a male-
gendered generic to refer generally to criminal defendants.167 
In contrast, Justice Alito pluralized the noun “judge,”168 used paired 
pronouns,169 and repeated the noun “defendant.”170  Notably, the portion of the 
 
Comm’n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2765 (2008) (“Federal law limits the amount of money that a candidate . . . 
and the candidate’s authorized committee may receive from an individual, as well as the amount 
that the candidate’s party may devote to coordinated campaign expenditures.”).  In contrast, Justice 
Stevens used masculine-gendered generics throughout his separate opinion in Davis.  See id. at 2778, 
2780, 2781–82 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1540 (2008) 
(Alito, J., concurring) ("[A]n inmate should be required to do more than simply offer the testimony 
of a few experts.  . . . Instead, an inmate . . . should point to a well-established scientific consensus.”); 
Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2563. 
 161. See, e.g., Corley, 129 S. Ct. at 1574 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[A]rrestees, after receiving Miranda 
warnings, may waive their rights.”); Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 129 S. Ct. 846, 855 (2009) 
(Alito, J., concurring) (“[W]hether the opposition clause shields employees who do not communicate 
their views to their employers through purposeful conduct is not before us in this case.”). 
 162. See, e.g., Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1765 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“When an alien subject to a final order 
of removal seeks to bar executive officials from acting upon that order . . . , the alien is seeking to 
‘enjoin’ his or her removal.”); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1225 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[I]f 
. . . a medical professional chooses to use IV push, he or she is on notice . . . ”); Crawford v. Metro 
Gov’t., 129 S. Ct. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Suppose, for example, that an employee alleges that 
he or she expressed opposition while informally chatting with a co-worker . . . ”); Greenlaw, 128 S. Ct. 
at 2573 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 163. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 823 (2009). 
 164. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 591. 
 165. See, e.g., id. at 594 (“[A] district judge must give serious consideration to the extent of any 
departure from the Guidelines and must explain his conclusion.”). 
 166. Id. at 596 (“What percentage, if any, should be assigned to evidence that a defendant poses 
no future threat to society, or to evidence that innocent third parties are dependent on him?”). 
 167. Id. at 602–03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The door therefore remains open for a defendant to 
demonstrate that his sentence . . . would not have been upheld.”). 
 168. Id. at 604 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[I]f judges are obligated to do no more than consult the 
Guidelines before deciding upon the sentence that is, in their independent judgment, sufficient.”).  
He also used the term “district courts.”  Id. 
 169. Id. at 608 (“If each judge is free to implement his or her personal views on such matters, 
sentencing disparities are inevitable.”). 
 170. Id. at 605 (“The Court has held that . . . a defendant has the right to have a jury, not a judge, 
find facts that increase the defendant’s authorized sentence.”). 
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Sentencing Guidelines analyzed in Gall includes the term “district court” rather 
than “judge,”171 providing a simple and clear alternative to avoid a gendered 
pronoun. 
Justice Alito has used masculine gendered-generics.  For example, 
dissenting in Arizona v. Gant, he used a masculine pronoun to refer to a “person 
who is taken from a vehicle.”172  In the remainder of his opinion, however, he 
avoided gendered generic pronouns by repeating the nouns “arrestee,”173 
“person,”174 and “officer,”175 and by pluralizing the noun “officer.”176  He has 
also used the gendered noun “draftsmanship.”177  These examples are, however, 
the exception, rather than the rule. 
Justice Alito demonstrates that gender-neutral writing is possible and can 
be accomplished without a reduction in clarity or style. 
2.  Justice Anthony Kennedy 
Justice Anthony Kennedy was born in 1936.  Prior to his appointment to the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, he was in private practice and taught 
Constitutional Law.  President Reagan nominated him to the Supreme Court in 
1988.178  Justice Kennedy is widely viewed as the most powerful member of the 
current Court because he is the lone swing vote, following Justice O’Connor’s 
departure.179  In an interview with Bryan Garner, Justice Kennedy 
acknowledged that the justices are judged by what they write: “[W]e are legal 
writers, for better or worse.”180 
Justice Kennedy has shown a willingness to use gender-neutral language in 
a number of cases, mainly by using paired pronouns, which he has done 
frequently over the course of all three terms.  Although he continues to use 
male-gendered generics, the frequency of his use of a gender-neutral technique 
 
 171. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (2009). 
 172. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1729 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[S]urely it was well 
known in 1981 that a person who is taken from a vehicle, handcuffed, and placed in the back of a 
patrol car is unlikely to make it back into his own car to retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence.”). 
 173. Id. at 1730. 
 174. Id. at 1730–31. 
 175. Id. at 1731 (“[I]t is not easy to see why an officer should not be able to search when the 
officer has reason to believe that the vehicle in question possesses evidence of a crime.”). 
 176. Id. at 1730 (“The ability of arresting officers to secure arrestees before conducting a search – 
and their incentive to do so – are facts that can hardly have escaped the Court’s attention.”); see also 
Greenlaw, 128 S. Ct. at 2573 (Alito, J., dissenting), in which Alito used a masculine-gendered 
pronoun: “It is not unreasonable to consider an appealing party to be on notice as to such serious 
errors of law in his favor.”  Id. at 2573, and paired pronouns: “When the Government files a notice of 
cross-appeal, the defendant is alerted to the possibility that his or her sentence may be increased.”  
Id. 
 177. Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 694 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[O]nly Congress 
can rescue the federal courts from the mire into which ACCA’s draftsmanship and Taylor’s 
‘categorical approach’ have pushed us.”). 
 178. The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 179. POSNER, supra note 144, at 310 (noting also that in the 2006-2007 terms, Kennedy was in the 
majority in all 24 of the Court's 5-4 decisions).  See also Liptak, supra note 5, at A1. 
 180. See The Supreme Court – Kennedy Interview, Part III, http://www.lawprose.org/ 
interviews/supreme_court.php (last visited October 14, 2009). 
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demonstrates a consciousness that places him in the “setting the standard” 
category. 
Justice Kennedy has used paired pronouns to refer to the following 
antecedents: “alien,”181 “government official,”182 “judge,”183 “aider and 
abettor,”184 “police officer or firefighter,”185 “employee,”186 “worker,”187 
“legislator,”188 “officer,”189 “DEA agent,”190 “prisoner,”191 “party,”192 “parent,”193 
and “person of ordinary skill.”194 
He appeared to use alternating pronouns in Kennedy v. Louisiana, in which 
the Court held that the death penalty is unconstitutional in child rape cases.  He 
used male- gendered generics to refer to the antecedents “perpetrator,”195 and 
“offender,”196 and used female-gendered generics to refer to the antecedent 
“child.”197  As noted earlier, this technique may have created some ambiguity.198  
 
 181. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1763 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Under the Court's four-part standard, the 
alien must show both irreparable injury and a likelihood of success on the merits, in addition to 
establishing the interests of the parties and the public weigh in his or her favor."). 
 182. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) ("Absent vicarious liability, each Government 
official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct."); see also id. at 
1953. 
 183. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2266 ("The statute accommodates the necessity for factfinding that 
will arise in some cases by allowing the appellate judge or Justice to transfer the case to a district 
court . . . , whose institutional capacity for factfinding is superior to his or her own."). 
 184. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, 128 S. Ct. at 771 (“Petitioner's view of primary liability makes any 
aider and abettor liable under § 10(b) if he or she committed a deceptive act.”). 
 185. Ky. Ret. Sys., 128 S. Ct. at 2372 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The young police officer or 
firefighter with a family is disabled in the heroic performance of his or her duty.”). 
 186. Id. at 2372 (“If the employee can no longer work as a result of a disability, however, he or 
she is entitled to receive disability retirement.”). 
 187. Id. at 2373. 
 188. Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“to 
prevent textual analysis from becoming so rarefied that it departs from how a legislator most likely 
understood the words when he or she voted for the law”). 
 189. Id. at 844 (“It takes this single last phrase to extend the statute so that it covers all detentions 
of property by any law enforcement officer in whatever capacity he or she acts.”); see also id. at 846-
47. 
 190. Id. at 847–48 (“[T]he DEA agent would be covered by § 2680(c)’s exception to the exception 
because he or she would be acting in a traditional revenue capacity.”). 
 191. Id. at 849 (“Only if the prisoner is ‘dissatisfied with the final agency action’ may he or she 
file suit in an ‘appropriate U.S. District Court.’”). 
 192. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 522 (2007) (“[T]here is no question that a 
party may represent his or her own interests in federal court without the aid of counsel.”). 
 193. Id. at 527 (“Nothing in these interlocking provisions excludes a parent who has exercised his 
or her own rights from statutory protection.”); see also id. at 529, 532. 
 194. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007) (“[A] person of ordinary skill has 
good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp.”). 
 195. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2665 ("In most cases justice is not better served by terminating the life 
of the perpetrator rather than confining him and preserving the possibility that he and the system 
will find ways to allow him to understand the enormity of his offense."). 
 196. Id. at 2662. 
 197. Id. at 2663 ("[C]hild rape cases present heightened concerns because the central narrative 
and account of the crime often comes from the child herself.  She and the accused are, in most 
instances, the only ones present when the crime was committed."). 
 198. See supra Section III.C. 
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The effectiveness of this style can be compared to Justice Alito’s dissent in the 
case, in which he repeated the words “perpetrator” and “child” to great effect, 
rather than using pronouns.199 
He has also used the noun “man” to refer to people generally: “Just as no 
man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias can arise 
when - without the consent of the other parties - a man chooses the judge in his 
own cause.”200  Although Kennedy did not use quotation marks here, he was 
referring back to a maxim from The Federalist No. 10, cited earlier in the case.201  
Conversely, in a voting rights case, he used the phrase “one-person, one-
vote,”202  rather than “one-man, one-vote,” demonstrating that a writer need not 
adopt the outdated language of earlier cases.  In an age discrimination case, 
Justice Kennedy used the gender-neutral occupational titles “police officer,”203 
“firefighter,”204 and “worker,”205 but later in the case referred to “policemen and 
firefighters.”206 
Justice Kennedy has used other gender-neutral techniques, including 
pluralizing the noun and pronoun,207 and repeating the noun.208  He has also 
used male-gendered pronouns for the generic antecedents “judge,”209 “party,”210 
“alien,”211 “worker,”212 “criminal defendant,”213 “prisoner,”214 and “driver.”215 
 
 199. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2665 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Court today holds that the Eighth 
Amendment categorically prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of raping a 
child.  This is so, according to the Court, no matter how young the child, no matter how many times 
the child is raped, no matter how many children the perpetrator rapes, no matter how sadistic the 
crime, no matter how much physical or psychological trauma is inflicted, and no matter how 
heinous the perpetrator's prior criminal record may be.”). 
 200. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009). 
 201. Id. at 2259. 
 202. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1239 (2009). 
 203. Ky. Ret. Sys., 128 S. Ct. at 2372 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 2373, 2378. 
 206. Id. at 2378. 
 207. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 ("Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional 
conduct of their subordinates."); Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2573 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[M]embers of the 
Legislative and Executive Branches are not excused from making constitutional determinations in 
the regular course of their duties.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 ("[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official 
defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."); Negusie v. 
Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1163 (2009) ("[A]n alien's motivation and intent are irrelevant to the issue 
whether an alien assisted in persecution."). 
 209. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259; see also id. at 2262 ("The Court asks not whether the judge is 
actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is 'likely' to be neutral.").  
In the same case, Kennedy also used the gender-neutral techniques of pluralizing and repeating the 
noun for the antecedent judge.  Id. at 2263 ("[J]udges often explain the reasons for their conclusions 
and rulings."). 
 210. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 ("Rule 9 merely excuses a party from pleading discriminatory intent 
under an elevated pleading standard.  It does not give him license to evade the less rigid – though 
still operative – strictures of Rule 8."). 
 211. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1162 ("An alien who fears persecution in his homeland and seeks 
refugee status in this country is barred from obtaining that relief if he has persecuted others."). 
 212. Ky. Ret. Sys, 128 S. Ct. at 2378 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The hypothetical younger 
worker seems entitled to a boost only if one accepts that the younger worker had more productive 
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Overall, Justice Kennedy’s opinions reveal a consciousness about gendered 
language and a willingness to write in a gender-neutral manner that is 
commendable.  Nevertheless, he should consider varying the gender-neutral 
techniques he employs to avoid the negative reaction some readers have to the 
frequent use of paired pronouns.216 
3.  Justice Clarence Thomas 
Justice Clarence Thomas was born in 1948, grew up in poverty, and 
attended segregated schools in Pin Point, Georgia.217  He served as Assistant 
Secretary for Civil Rights in the U.S. Department of Education and as Chair of 
the EEOC.218  President George H.W. Bush nominated him to the District of 
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in 1990 and to the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1991.  He is the second African-American to serve on the Court.219  Known for 
rarely asking questions at oral argument, he was considered the most 
conservative member of the Rehnquist Court.220  He told Bryan Garner that he 
admires “simplicity and clarity” in writing and believes that the Court’s 
opinions should be “accessible to nonlawyers.”221 
Placing Justice Thomas in the “setting the standard” category was a close 
call, because he continues to use gendered generics.  He can be viewed as setting 
the standard based on his frequent use of a variety of gender-neutral writing 
techniques, including repeating the noun,222 pluralizing the noun,223 using 
paired pronouns,224 and avoiding the use of a pronoun.225 
 
years of work left in him.").  In the same case, Kennedy also used paired pronouns with the 
antecedent worker.  Id. at 2373. 
 213. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 80 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The rule settled by 
these cases requires a court . . . to order a new trial when a defendant shows his conviction has been 
obtained in a trial tainted by an atmosphere of coercion or intimidation.”). 
 214. Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2848 (2007) (“Prior findings of competency do not 
foreclose a prisoner from proving he is incompetent to be executed because of his present mental 
condition.”). 
 215. KSR Int’l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1735 (“When the driver takes his foot off the pedal . . . ”). 
 216. See, e.g., GARNER, supra note 19, at 316 (Garner recommends only limited use of paired 
pronouns because it “sounds stilted” and can be “obnoxious” if overused.). 
 217. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited on October 14, 2009); TOOBIN, supra note 144, at 26; JAN 
CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT 327 (2008). 
 218. The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 219. See TOOBIN, supra note 144, at 26; GREENBURG, supra note 217, at 110. 
 220. TOOBIN, supra note 144, at  99, 103. 
 221. The Supreme Court – Thomas Interview, Part I, http://www.lawprose.org/interviews/ 
supreme_court.php (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 222. See, e.g., Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009) (“Finding that counsel is 
deficient by abandoning a defense where there is nothing to gain from that abandonment is 
equivalent to finding that counsel is deficient by declining to pursue a strategy where there is 
nothing to lose from pursuit of that strategy.”); Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1185 (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
Quanta Computer, 128 S. Ct. at 2122. 
 223. See, e.g., Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2132 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Congress did 
not grant § 1983 plaintiffs a ‘right’ to bring their claims in state court.”); Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1180 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[F]or many individuals who (like petitioner) have both persecuted others 
and been persecuted, the scheme provides temporary refuge; they will receive deferral of removal 
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Justice Thomas has used male-gendered pronouns for the following generic 
antecedents: “defendant” (criminal),226 “alien,”227 “accomplice,”228 “officer,”229 
and “participant” (in a 401(k) plan).230 
For some opinions, no conclusions could be drawn, even when gendered 
language appeared at first glance.  For example, in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, which 
interpreted an arbitration clause in union employees’ contracts, all three 
respondents were male, so Justice Thomas’ description of their jobs as 
“watchmen”231 and “handyman”232 did not meet the criteria for use of male-
gendered generics.  In addition, the briefs in that case used these terms,233 thus 
raising the possibility that their repetition might have added to the clarity of the 
opinion.  Other occupational terms used in the case were gender neutral: 
“cleaners, porters, and doorpersons.”234 
 
under the CAT if they will face torture upon their return to their home country.”); Quanta Computer, 
128 S. Ct. at 2117–18. 
 224. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1178, n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“‘Deferral of removal’ was created to 
accommodate Congress' direction to exclude those who fall within the INA persecutor bar ‘[t]o the 
maximum extent consistent with the obligations of the United States under the [CAT]’ to not return 
an alien to a country in which he or she will be tortured.”). 
 225. Carey, 549 U.S. at 76 (“This Court has never addressed a claim that such private-actor 
courtroom conduct was so inherently prejudicial that it deprived a defendant of a fair trial.”).  A 
lazier writer might have ended the sentence less concisely by adding a pronoun: “it deprived a 
defendant of his right to a fair trial.”; Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2363 (2007) (“According to 28 
U.S.C. § 2107(a), parties must file notices of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the judgment being 
appealed.”).  In contrast, a less gender-neutral version of this sentence might state that, “a party 
must file his notice of appeal.”  See also id. at 2365 (“[A] petition for writ of certiorari must be filed 
within 90 days of the entry of the judgment to be reviewed.”). 
 226. See, e.g., Knowles, 129 S. Ct. at 1415–16 (“[A] defendant must show that he was incapable of 
knowing or understanding the nature of his act or of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of 
the offense.”); id. at 1419; Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 681, 686 (2009). 
 227. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1184 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he INA imposes a voluntariness 
requirement in a host of statutory provisions, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2)(D) (terminating asylum 
when alien has “voluntarily” availed himself of the protection of his country).”). 
 228. Waddington v. Sarausad, 129 S. Ct. 823, 829 (2009) (“[A]n accomplice who knows of one 
crime . . . is not guilty of a greater crime . . . if he has no knowledge of that greater crime.”); see also id. 
at 830, n.3. 
 229. Ali, 128 S. Ct. at 838, n.5 (“[T]hat argument is based on the assumption that an officer who 
assists in conducting a border search acts in a customs capacity even if he is not a customs officer 
and is not enforcing a customs law.”). 
 230. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1020, 1029 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“[W]hen a participant sustains losses to his individual account as a result of a fiduciary breach, the 
plan’s aggregate assets are likewise diminished . . . ”). 
 231. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1461. 
 232. Id. at 1462. 
 233. See Brief for Appellee-Respondent at 14, 28, 2008 WL 2774462 at *4 (July 14, 2008); 14 Penn 
Plaza v. Pyett, No. 07-581 (2008). 
 234. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1461. 
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D.  Lagging Behind 
1. Justice Antonin Scalia 
Justice Antonin Scalia was born in New Jersey in 1936.235  He taught at 
several law schools and served in the U.S. Department of Justice during the 
Nixon and Ford Administrations.236  He joined the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals in 1982 and took his seat as the first Italian-American on the 
Supreme Court after his nomination by President Reagan in 1986.237  In 2008, the 
organization Scribes presented Scalia with a lifetime achievement award to 
recognize his skill as a legal writer.  In his acceptance speech, he described 
“writing genius” as “the ability to place oneself in the shoes of the audience.”238 
As the following quote demonstrates, Justice Scalia is a strong proponent of 
the generic male pronoun: 
I find it incomprehensible that my esteemed coauthor, who has displayed the 
inventiveness of a DaVinci and the imagination of a Tolkien in devising 
circumlocutions that have purged from my contributions to this volume (at 
some stylistic cost) all use of “he” as the traditional, generic, unisex reference to 
a human being.  . . . (Invisible, my eye.  I’ll bet you can spot the places where 
force or simplicity has been sacrificed to second-best circumlocution.  As for 
distraction: To those of us who believe that “he” means, and has always meant, 
“he or she” when not referring to a male antecedent, the ritual shunning of it to 
avoid giving offense to gender-neutralizers is . . . well, distracting.)239 
Justice Scalia was responding to coauthor Bryan Garner’s insistence that 
their recent book on persuasive legal writing be drafted using gender-neutral 
language.240  Given this sentiment, it is not surprising that Justice Scalia is the 
most frequent and consistent user of male-gendered generics on the Court. 
Justice Scalia has used male-gendered pronouns for the following generic 
antecedents: “criminal defendant,”241 “capital convict,”242 “arrestee,”243 
“soldier,”244 “alien,”245 “persecutor,”246 “plaintiff,”247 “voter,”248 “trustee,”249 “a 
 
 235. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 236. See TOOBIN, supra note 144, at 200. 
 237. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited October 14, 2009); TOOBIN, supra note 144, at 18. 
 238. A video of Justice Scalia’s remarks is available at http://www.scribes.org. 
 239. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 119.  The parenthetical comment is an aside directed at 
Garner’s advocacy of “invisible gender neutrality.”  Id. at 116–17. 
 240. See id. at 116–17. 
 241. See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2081, 2083 (2009); Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602–03 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 242. Harbison v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481, 1498 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting and concurring). 
 243. Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1724 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 244. Negusie,129 S. Ct. at 1169 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]here is no historical support for the 
duress defense when a soldier follows a military order he knows to be unlawful.”). 
 245. Id. at 1170. 
 246. Id. at 1169. 
 247. Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009) (“To seek injunctive relief, a 
plaintiff must show that he is under threat of suffering ‘injury in fact’ that is concrete and 
particularized.”). 
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person executed for a crime,”250 “child,”251 “nonmember” (of a public-sector 
union),252 (congressional) “representative,”253 “candidate,”254 “speaker,”255 
“public official,”256 “judge,”257 “taxpayer,”258 “plaintiff,”259 “eyewitness,”260 
“analyst,”261 and “one.”262 
He has also used male-gendered nouns generically.  For example, in FCC v. 
Fox Television,263 in which the court examined the agency’s enforcement policies 
over the use of indecent language, Justice Scalia discussed Congress’ influence 
over government agencies, and noted the importance of “committee 
chairmanships.”264  Later in this opinion, he referred to the “yeomen of the 
airwaves.”265  He has also used the gendered terms “draftsmanship”266 and 
“countrymen in arms.”267  Interestingly, in District of Columbia v. Heller,268 the 
 
 248. Crawford v. Marion County, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1626 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“A voter 
complaining about such a law’s effect on him has no valid equal-protection claim.”). 
 249. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2359 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A trustee 
abuses his discretion by acting dishonestly when, for example, he accepts bribes.”). 
 250. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1554 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[H]e lacks a single example of a person 
executed for a crime he did not commit in the current American system.”). 
 251. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 538 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (“The right to a free 
appropriate public education obviously inheres in the child, for it is he who receives the 
education.”). 
 252. Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass’n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2377–80 (2007) (“[A] nonmember 
must shoulder the burden of objecting before a union can be barred from spending his fees . . .”). 
 253. Wisc. Rt. To Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2674–75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Well, in the United States 
(making due allowance for the fact that we have elected representatives instead of a king) it is a 
crime, at least if the speaker is a union or a corporation . . . and if the representative is identified by 
name within a certain period before a primary or congressional election in which he is running.”). 
 254. Id. at 2677. 
 255. Id. at 2681 (“In this critical area of political discourse, the speaker cannot be compelled to 
risk felony prosecution with no more assurance of impunity than his prediction that what he says 
will be found susceptible of some ‘reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or 
against a specific candidate.’”). 
 256. Id. at 2683. 
 257. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2477 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 258. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2574. 
 259. Id. (“[T]his conceptualizing of injury in fact in purely mental terms conflicts squarely with 
the familiar proposition that a plaintiff lacks a concrete and particularized injury when his only 
complaint is the generalized grievance that the law is being violated.”). 
 260. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536–37 (“Like the eyewitness who has fabricated his account to 
the police, the analyst who provides false results may, under oath in open court, reconsider his false 
testimony.”). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2584 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“And of course the case has engendered no 
reliance interests, not only because one does not arrange his affairs with an eye to standing, but also 
because there is no relying on the random and irrational.”). 
 263. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
 264. Id. at 1817. 
 265. Id. at 1819. 
 266. Harbison, 129 S. Ct. at 1497 (Scalia, J., dissenting and concurring) (“In a statute that is such a 
paragon of shoddy draftsmanship . . . ”). 
 267. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Last week, 13 of our countrymen in 
arms were killed.”).  It is, of course, possible that Scalia confirmed the gender of those killed that 
week to ensure the accuracy of this statement. 
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2007 Term’s landmark Second Amendment case, he used both the gender-
neutral “militia members”269 and the male-gendered “militiamen.”270  This study 
revealed few examples in which Justice Scalia used gender-neutral writing 
techniques.271 
Justice Scalia may need to work harder to place himself in the “shoes of the 
audience.”  Scribes, the organization that recognized Scalia for his writing, seeks 
to promote legal writing that is “clear, succinct, and forceful” and to discourage 
writing that is “archaic, turgid, obscure, and needlessly dull.”272  While few 
would argue Scalia’s writing is dull, his continued use of male-gendered 
generics is certainly archaic. 
In Making Your Case, Justice Scalia and his coauthor Bryan Garner urge 
legal writers seeking to persuade to “value clarity above all other elements of 
style” because “it ensures you’ll be understood.”273  They make the further point 
that writing with clarity, even at the potential cost of “elegance of style” in some 
instances, will prevent an opponent from mischaracterizing and distorting the 
writer’s meaning.274  Scalia’s use of male-gendered generics contradicts his 
statements about the importance of clarity. 
2. Chief Justice John Roberts 
Chief Justice John Roberts was born in 1955, making him the youngest 
member of the Court.  In 1980, he served as a law clerk to Supreme Court Justice 
William Rehnquist.  During the Reagan Administration, he served as Special 
Assistant to the U.S. Attorney General and Associate Counsel in the White 
House Counsel’s Office.275  During this period, he reportedly opposed 
affirmative action and “dismissed ‘the purported gender gap’ between men and 
women in income.”276  He was the Principal Deputy Solicitor General during the 
presidency of George H.W. Bush and served on the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals before President George W. Bush nominated him to be Chief 
Justice in 2005.277  In an article published near the end of Roberts’ fourth term on 
the Court, Jeffrey Toobin described the Chief Justice as a “doctrinaire 
 
 268. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 269. Id. at 2792. 
 270. Id. (“Petitioners point to militia laws of the founding period that required militia members 
to ‘keep’ arms.  . . . ‘Keep arms’ was simply a common way of referring to possessing arms, for 
militiamen and everyone else.”). 
 271. In one case, he pluralized the noun and the pronoun.  See Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct at 
1813 (“Here it suffices to know that children mimic the behavior they observe – or at least the 
behavior that is presented to them as normal and appropriate.”); see also id. at 1818. 
 272. See Scribes, American Society of Legal Writers, http://www.scribes.org (last visited October 
14, 2009). 
 273. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 11, at 107–08. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 276. TOOBIN, supra note 144, at 280. 
 277. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited October 14, 2009). 
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conservative” who “has served the interests, and reflected the values, of the 
contemporary Republican Party.”278 
Like Justice Scalia, the Chief Justice is a frequent user of male-gendered 
pronouns in rule statements and when speaking generally about both men and 
women.  He has used male-gendered pronouns with the following antecedents: 
“alien,”279 “judge,”280 “defendant” (criminal),281 “supporter” (of a judge),282 
“party,”283 “litigant,”284 “public employee,”285 “officer,”286 “plaintiff,”287 
“condemned prisoner,”288 “prudent investor,”289 “individual,”290 “nonmember” 
(of a tribe),291 and in one case, “prisoner” and “inmate.”292 
In several cases, the Chief Justice has avoided gendered generics by 
pluralizing the noun293 and repeating the noun instead of using a singular 
pronoun.294  In one instance, he used paired pronouns to refer, generally, to a 
 
 278. Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy, THE NEW YORKER, May 25, 2009, at 44. 
 279. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1762; compare Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, using “his or her,” id. at 
1749, and Justice Alito’s dissent, using “his or her,” id. at 1765, and repeating the noun, id. at 1768. 
 280. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2268 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[A] judge may not preside over a case 
in which he has a 'direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest.'"); see also id. at 2269. 
 281. Id. at 2268 ("[A] defendant's due process rights are violated when he is tried before a judge 
who is 'paid for his service only when he convicts the defendant.'"). 
 282. Id. at 2270. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 2271 ("Does a litigant waive his due process claim if he waits until after decision to 
raise it?"). 
 285. Ysursa, 129 S. Ct. at 1096 (“Under Idaho law, a public employee may elect to have a portion 
of his wages deducted by his employer and remitted to his union.”). 
 286. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 703 (2009) (“These circumstances frequently include 
a particular officer’s knowledge and experience, . . . but not his subjective intent[.]). 
 287. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2009) (“A plaintiff seeking 
a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits.”). 
 288. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1537. 
 289. Knight v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 128 S. Ct.782, 790-91 (2008) (“[T]he standard 
looks to what a prudent investor with the same investment objectives handling his own affairs 
would do.”). 
 290. Id. at 787 (“The fact that an individual could not do something is one reason he would 
not.”). 
 291. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2724 (2008) 
(“[T]hose laws and regulations may be fairly imposed on nonmembers only if the nonmember has 
consented, either expressly or by his actions.”). 
 292. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203–07 (2007) (“These rules require a prisoner to allege and 
demonstrate exhaustion in his complaint.”). 
 293. See, e.g., Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1855 (“[I]t is not unusual to punish individuals for the 
unintended consequences of their unlawful acts.”); compare Stevens dissent, using “he” for generic 
defendant.  Id. at 1859; Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501, 509–10 (2007) (“[T]axpayers with 
comparatively fewer resources are more likely to contest their assessed deficiency before first paying 
it.”). 
 294. See, e.g., Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1855 (“The felony-murder rule is a familiar example: If a 
defendant commits an unintended homicide while committing another felony, the defendant can be 
convicted of murder.”); Wisc. Rt. to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2660 (“It encompasses any broadcast, cable, or 
satellite communication that refers to a candidate for federal office and that is aired within 30 days of 
a federal primary election or 60 days of a federal general election in the jurisdiction in which that 
candidate is running for office.”). 
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congressional representative.295  He has also used gender-neutral nouns, 
including “Members of Congress,” “Representative,”296 “legislators,”297 
“reasonable people,”298 and “framers” (of the Constitution).299 
In his interview with Bryan Garner, Roberts noted that for lawyers, 
“language is the central tool of our trade,” that words are the “building blocks of 
the law,” and that if judges are not “fastidious with language” the effectiveness 
and clarity of the law may be diminished.  He acknowledged that, “we can all 
do better” in this regard.300  When it comes to gender-neutral language, Justice 
Roberts could indeed do better. 
3. Justice David Souter 
Justice David Souter was born in 1939.  His home is in New Hampshire, 
where he has served as Attorney General, and as an Associate Justice of both the 
Superior Court and the Supreme Court.  In 1990, shortly after he joined the First 
District Court of Appeals, President George H.W. Bush nominated him to the 
Supreme Court.301 
Although some hoped that Souter’s replacement of Justice Brennan would 
allow conservatives to “firmly take ideological control of the Court,”302 he soon 
became “one of its most liberal.”303 
Justice Souter is the only Supreme Court justice who did not sit for an 
interview with Bryan Garner.304  In May 2009, he announced that he would 
retire from the Court at the end of the term.305  He has been replaced by Sonia 
Sotomayor of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the first Latina and the third 
woman to serve on the Supreme Court.306 
Justice Souter has been a fairly consistent user of male-gendered generic 
pronouns.  He has used them to refer to the following generic antecedents: 
“accomplice,”307 “juror,”308 “supervisor,”309 “employer,”310 “plaintiff,”311 
 
 295. Wisc. Rt. to Life,127 S. Ct. at 2668 (“[A]n ad run at that time may succeed in getting more 
constituents to contact the Representative while he or she is back home.”). 
 296. Id. 
 297. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. at 1092 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 298. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1537. 
 299. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1362. 
 300. See The Supreme Court – Roberts Interview, Part I, http://www.lawprose.org/interviews/ 
supreme_court.php (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 301. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 302. GREENBURG, supra note 217, at 88. 
 303. Id. at 107. 
 304. See The Supreme Court, http://www.lawprose.org/interviews/supreme_court.php (last 
visited October 14, 2009). 
 305. Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny, Souter Said to Be Leaving Court in June, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at 
A1. 
 306. Charlie Savage, Sotomayor, After a Pair of Oaths, Officially Joins the Nation’s Highest Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at A10. 
 307. Waddington, 129 S. Ct. at 836 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]n 1998, the State Court of Appeals 
set out the principles on which it understood accomplice liability in Washington to be premised.  It 
did not say that the accomplice must understand that he is aiding in the commission of the same 
offense the principal has in mind.”). 
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“veteran,”312 “claimant,”313 “arrested person,”314 “officer,”315 “defendant” 
(criminal),316 “litigant,”317 “person,”318 “passenger,”319 “occupant” (of a car),320 
“reader or listener” (of a political ad),321 and “party.”322  He also used the term 
“fleeing man” to illustrate an example.323 
 
 308. Id. at 838 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Even a juror with a preternatural grasp of the statutory 
subtlety would have lost his grip after listening to the prosecutor’s closing argument.”). 
 309. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The nature of a supervisory liability theory is 
that the supervisor may be liable, under certain conditions, for the wrongdoing of his 
subordinates."). 
 310. Id. at 1958. 
 311. Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1252 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[A] § 2 plaintiff must also be able to place 
himself in a reasonably compact district that could have been drawn to improve upon the plan 
actually selected."); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969, n.8 (2007) (“[W]hen a 
complaint adequately states a claim, it may not be dismissed based on a district court’s assessment 
that the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his allegations or prove his claim to the 
satisfaction of the factfinder.”). 
 312. Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1708–09 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) fails to notify a veteran of the information needed to support 
his benefit claim, . . . must the veteran prove the error harmful?”). 
 313. Id. at 1709 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The VA differs from virtually every other agency in 
being itself obliged to help the claimant develop his claim.”). 
 314. Corley, 129 S. Ct. at 1562 (“[A]n arrested person’s confession is admissible if given after an 
unreasonable delay in bringing him before a judge.”). 
 315. Id. at 1562 (“The common law obliged an arresting officer to bring his prisoner before a 
magistrate as soon as he reasonably could.”); Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2407 (2007) (“It is 
also reasonable for passengers to expect that a police officer at the scene of a crime, arrest, or 
investigation will not let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety.”). 
 316. See, e.g., Corley, 129 S. Ct. at 1568 (“Thus would many a Rule of Evidence be overridden in 
case after case: a defendant’s self-incriminating statement to his lawyer would be admissible despite 
his insistence on attorney-client privilege.”); Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2485 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“For if 
judicial factfinding necessary for an enhanced sentencing range were held to be adequate in the face 
of a defendant’s objection, a defendant’s right to have a jury standing between himself and the 
power of the government to curtail his liberty would take on a previously unsuspected modesty.”). 
 317. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2618 (2008) (“[A] litigant could add new 
constitutional claims as he went along, simply because he had ‘consistently argued’ that a 
challenged regulation was unconstitutional.”). 
 318. Watson v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 579, 586 (2007) (“Given ordinary meaning and the 
conventions of English, we hold that a person does not ‘use’ a firearm . . . when he receives it in 
trade for drugs.”); see also id. at 581–83. 
 319. Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2407 (“[T]he passenger will expect to be subject to some scrutiny, and 
his attempt to leave the scene would be so obviously likely to prompt an objection from the officer 
that no passenger would feel free to leave in the first place.”). 
 320. Id. at 2409 (“[F]or a specific occupant of the car to be seized he must be the motivating target 
of an officer’s show of authority.”); see also id. at 2410 (“But an occupant of a car who knows that he 
is stuck in traffic because another car has been pulled over . . . would not perceive a show of 
authority as directed at him or his car.”). 
 321. Wisc. Rt. To Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2693 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“An issue ad is an advertisement 
on a political subject urging the reader or listener to let a politician know what he thinks.”). 
 322. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2369 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[W]e did not actually treat [time limits] as 
beyond exemption to the point of shrugging at the inequity of penalizing a party for relying on what 
a federal judge had said to him.”). 
 323. Brendlin, 127 S. Ct. at 2409 (“But what may amount to submission depends on what a person 
was doing before the show of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physically 
overpowered.”). 
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In Exxon Shipping, Co. v. Baker,324 he used male-gendered maritime terms, 
including “helmsman,”325 “fishermen,”326 and “shipmaster.”327  In the same case, 
he used the universally adopted gender-neutral term “reasonable people.”328  He 
has also employed other gender-neutral nouns like “Framers,”329 and 
“drafters.”330  In his dissent in Crawford v. Marion County, he used male-
gendered pronouns for the antecedents “plaintiff,”331 “an individual who 
impersonates another at the polls,”332 and “imposter,”333 but alternated 
pronouns for the antecedent “voter.”334 
In two cases from the 2008 Term, Justice Souter used female-gendered 
generics.  In Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, the Court 
interpreted the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII in the context of a sexual 
harassment complaint.  The petitioner was a woman.335  In the following 
passages, Souter appears to be speaking generally, rather than specifically about 
Ms. Crawford: 
[N]othing in the statute requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who 
reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same 
discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question.336 
The appeals court’s rule would thus create a real dilemma.  . . . If the employee 
reported discrimination in response to the enquiries, the employer might well be 
free to penalize her for speaking up.  But if she kept quiet about the 
discrimination and later filed a Title VII claim, the employer might well escape 
liability.337 
Justice Souter did not use masculine-gendered generics in this opinion, 
except when quoting the relevant language of Title VII, which uses masculine 
pronouns to refer to both “employer” and “employees.”338 
 
 324. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). 
 325. Id. at 2612. 
 326. Id. at 2613. 
 327. Id. at 2615. 
 328. Id. at 2627. 
 329. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008). 
 330. Hall St. Assocs., 128 S. Ct. at 1406, n.7. 
 331. 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]t would greatly aid a plaintiff to 
establish his claims beyond mathematical doubt.”). 
 332. Id. at 1637 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 333. Id. at 1638 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“If an imposter gets caught, he is subject to severe 
criminal penalties.”). 
 334. Compare id. at 1637 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“And even [if] the State’s interest in deterring a 
voter from showing up at the polls and claiming to be someone he is not must, in turn, be 
discounted . . . ”), with id. at 1641, n. 33 (“The voter is not required to make a second trip to have her 
provisional ballot counted.”).  See also id. at 1631, n.19 (“To vote by provisional ballot, an individual 
must . . . sign an affidavit affirming that she is ‘indigent.’”).  Id. at 1633, n.24 (“[T]he Constitution 
protects an individual’s ability to vote, not merely his decision to do so.”). 
 335. See 129 S. Ct. 846, 849 (2009). 
 336. Id. at 851. 
 337. Id. at 852. 
 338. See id. at 850. 
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In the second case, the Court interpreted ERISA’s antialienation provision.  
The designated beneficiary in the case was a woman.339  Justice Souter alternated 
feminine and masculine pronouns to refer to a generic beneficiary.  His use of 
male-gendered pronouns is easily identifiable as generic: 
The court relied on Fifth Circuit precedent establishing that a beneficiary can 
waive his rights to the proceeds of an ERISA plan.340 
Although the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust traditionally lacked the means to 
transfer his beneficial interest to anyone else, he did have the power to disclaim 
prior to accepting it, so long as the disclaimer made no attempt to direct the 
interest to a beneficiary in his stead.341 
[T]he general principle that a designated spendthrift can disclaim his trust 
interest magnifies the improbability that a statute writ with an eye on the old 
law would effectively force a beneficiary to take an interest willy-nilly.342 
Similarly, he appears to have used feminine pronouns in the context of 
general statements, although both examples are within paragraphs that 
specifically address the argument of the female respondent: 
DuPont argues that Liv’s waiver would have been an invalid disclaimer at 
common law because it was given for consideration in the divorce settlement.  
But the authorities DuPont cites fail to support the proposition that a 
beneficiary’s otherwise valid disclaimer was invalid at common law because she 
received consideration.343 
DuPont’s argument rests on a false premise.  In fact, a beneficiary seeking only 
to relinquish her right to benefits cannot do this by a QDRO.344 
4. Justice Stephen Breyer 
Justice Stephen Breyer was born in 1938 in San Francisco.345  After 
graduating from Harvard Law School, he clerked for Supreme Court Justice 
Arthur Goldberg, worked as a Special Assistant to the Assistant U.S. Attorney 
General for Antitrust, as an Assistant Special Prosecutor of the Watergate 
Special Prosecution Force, and as Chief Counsel to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.346  He also taught at Harvard in both the Law School and the 
Kennedy School of Government.347  He served on the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals from 1980 to 1994, when President Bill Clinton nominated him to the 
 
 339. Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. and Inv. Plan, 129 S. Ct. 865, 869 (2009). 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at 871–72. 
 342. Id. at 872.  Souter also used a masculine pronoun for the generic antecedent “plan 
participant”: “The point is that by giving a plan participant a clear set of instructions for making his 
own instructions clear, ERISA forecloses any justification for enquiries into nice expressions of 
intent.”  Id. at 875. 
 343. Id. at 872, n.6. 
 344. Id. at 873. 
 345. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. 
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Supreme Court.348  He is considered part of the liberal wing of the Roberts 
Court.349  Judge Richard Posner has described him as the “most pragmatic” 
member of the Roberts Court.350  Bryan Garner has noted that Justice Breyer’s 
writing, according to “scholars,” is “known for its clarity.”351 
Justice Breyer fits in the “lagging behind” category because he frequently 
uses male-gendered generics.  For example, he has used male-gendered generics 
for the antecedents “administrator,”352 “holder of a future interest,”353 
“landowner,”354 “individual who fails to report” (to prison),355 “trustee,”356 
“employee,”357 “disabled worker,”358  “offender,”359 “resident,”360 “officer,”361 
“voter,”362 “individual,”363 “aider and abettor,”364 and “judge.”365 
 
 348. Id. 
 349. TOOBIN, supra note 144, at 327. 
 350. POSNER, supra note 144, at 320. 
 351. See The Supreme Court – Breyer Interview Part 2, http://www.lawprose.org/ 
interviews/supreme_court.php (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 352. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1830–31 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“An (imaginary) 
administrator explaining why he chose a policy that requires driving on the right-side.”). 
 353. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Would courts deny standing to a holder 
of a future interest in property who complains that a life tenant's waste of the land will almost 
inevitably hurt the value of his interest--though he will have no personal interest for several years 
into the future?”). 
 354. Id. (“Would courts deny standing to a landowner who complains that a neighbor's upstream 
dam constitutes a nuisance--even if the harm to his downstream property . . . will not occur for 
several years?”). 
 355. Chambers, 129 S. Ct. at 692 (“[A]n individual who fails to report would seem unlikely . . . to 
call attention to his whereabouts.”). 
 356. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,128 S. Ct. at 2350 (“Trust law continues to apply a deferential standard of 
review . . . , while at the same time requiring the reviewing judge to take account of the conflict 
when determining whether the trustee . . . has abused his discretion.”). 
 357. Ky. Ret. Sys., 128 S. Ct. at 2367–68 (“[E]very such employee, when hired, is promised 
disability retirement benefits should he become disabled prior to the time that he is eligible for 
normal retirement benefits.”). 
 358. Id. at 2368 (“[T]he whole purpose of the disability rules is, as Kentucky claims, to treat a 
disabled worker as though he had become disabled after, rather than before, he had become eligible 
for normal retirement benefits.”); see also id. at 2369. 
 359. See, e.g., Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (2008) (“[A]n offender’s criminal 
history is relevant to the question whether he is a career criminal, or, more precisely, to the kind or 
degree of danger the offender would pose were he to possess a gun.”); Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 
549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) (“[A]n offender . . . may show that the statute was so applied in his own 
case.”). 
 360. Heller, 128 S. Ct at 2863 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The District’s law does prevent a resident 
from keeping a loaded handgun in his home.”); see also id. at 2864. 
 361. Id. at 2864 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ban’s very objective is to reduce significantly the 
number of handguns in the District, say, for example, by allowing a law enforcement officer 
immediately to assume that any handgun he sees is an illegal handgun.”). 
 362. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A] . . . voter who lacks photo ID may 
cast a provisional ballot . . . that will be counted if the State determines that his signature matches 
the one on his voter registration forms.”). 
 363. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1385 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Convention provision is about an 
individual’s ‘rights,’ namely, his right upon being arrested to be informed of his separate right to 
contact his nation’s consul.”). 
 364. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 190 (“California defines ‘aiding and abetting’ such that an aider 
and abettor is criminally responsible . . . for the crime he intends.”). 
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Justice Breyer has employed both gender-neutral techniques and gendered 
generics in the same case.  For example, in Shinseki v. Sanders, a case about 
veterans’ benefits in which the veterans seeking disability benefits were a man 
and a woman, Breyer used paired pronouns for the generic antecedent 
“veteran.”366  In the next paragraph he used the gender-neutral techniques of 
pairing pronouns and repeating the noun, then reverted to using a masculine-
gendered generic: 
Repeating these statutory requirements in its regulations, the VA has said it will 
provide a claimant with a letter that tells the claimant (1) what further 
information is necessary to substantiate his or her claim; (2) what portions of 
that information the VA will obtain for the claimant; and (3) what portions the 
claimant must obtain.  38 CFR § 3.159(b) (2008).  At the time of the decisions 
below, the regulations also required the VA to tell the claimant (4) that he may 
submit any other relevant information that he has available.367 
In the remainder of his opinion, Justice Breyer continued to use male-
gendered pronouns for the antecedents “veteran,”368 “claimant,”369 “party,”370 
and “individual,”371 returning to paired pronouns at the end of the opinion to 
acknowledge the “special solicitude” Congress has for veterans.372 
Similarly, Justice Breyer’s opinion in Van De Kamp v. Goldstein, which 
extended absolute prosecutorial immunity to several claims asserted under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, also presents a mixed picture.  He used several gender-neutral 
writing techniques, including repeating the noun “prosecutor”: 
We have held that absolute immunity does not apply when a prosecutor gives 
advice to police during a criminal investigation, . . . when the prosecutor makes 
statements to the press, . . . or when a prosecutor acts as a complaining witness 
in support of a warrant application.373 
 
 365. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468 (“The statute does call for the judge to ‘state’ his ‘reasons.’”); see also 
id. at 2465, 2468–69.  In his concurrence in this case, Justice Stevens used a feminine-gendered generic 
for the antecedent “judge.”  Id. at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 366. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. at 1700 (“The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 requires the VA to 
help a veteran develop his or her benefits claim.”). 
 367. Id. at 1700–01. 
 368. Id. at 1701 (“[E]rrors of Types Two, Three, or Four (i.e., a failure to explain just who . . . must 
provide the needed material or to tell the veteran that he may submit any other evidence available) 
do not have the ‘natural effect’ of harming the claimant.  In these latter instances, the claimant must 
show how the error caused harm, . . . by stating . . . ‘what evidence’ he would have provided.”). 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. at 1706 (“The party seeking to reverse the result of a civil proceeding will likely be in a 
position at least as good as . . . the opposing party to explain how he has been hurt by an error.”). 
 371. Id. (“In criminal cases the Government seeks to deprive an individual of his liberty, thereby 
providing a good reason to require the Government to explain why an error should not upset the 
trial court’s determination.”). 
 372. Id. at 1707 (“A veteran, after all, has performed an especially important service for the 
Nation, often at the risk of his or her own life.  . . . [T]he VA has a statutory duty to help the veteran 
develop his or her benefits claim.”).  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter used masculine-
gendered generics throughout.  See id. at 1708–09 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 373. 129 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2009). 
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He also alternated gendered generic pronouns for the antecedent 
“prosecutor”: 
The “public trust of the prosecutor’s office would suffer” were the prosecutor to 
have in mind his “own potential” damages “liability” when making 
prosecutorial decisions—as he might well were he subject to § 1983 liability.374 
The only difference we can find between Imbler and our hypothetical case lies in 
the fact that, in our hypothetical case, a prosecutorial supervisor or colleague 
might himself be liable for damages instead of the trial prosecutor.375 
A trial prosecutor would remain immune, even for intentionally failing to turn 
over, say Giglio material; but her supervisor might be liable for negligent training 
or supervision.376 
Later in the case, Breyer used both a male pronoun and paired pronouns 
for the antecedent “plaintiff”: 
We recognize, as Chief Judge Hand pointed out, that sometimes such immunity 
deprives a plaintiff of compensation that he undoubtedly merits; but the 
impediments to the fair, efficient functioning of a prosecutorial office that 
liability could create lead us to find that Imbler must apply here.377 
Consequently, where a § 1983 plaintiff claims that a prosecutor’s management of 
a trial-related information system is responsible for a constitutional error at his 
or her particular trial, the prosecutor responsible for the system enjoys absolute 
immunity just as would the prosecutor who handled the particular trial itself.378 
In other cases, Justice Breyer also used the gender-neutral techniques of 
pluralizing the noun and the pronoun,379 repeating the noun,380 and using paired 
pronouns.381 
The overall picture presented by these opinions is one of inconsistency.  
Justice Breyer appears comfortable with a variety of gender-neutral techniques; 
it should therefore require minimal effort for him to decrease his use of male-
gendered generics. 
 
 374. Id. at 860. 
 375. Id. at 862. 
 376. Id. at 863. 
 377. Id. at 864. 
 378. Id. 
 379. See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Nor was the FCC 
ever unaware . . . that children’s surroundings influence their behavior.”); Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. 
Ct. 2618, 2642 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he law prohibited judges from passing on 
constitutional questions, only that it did not require them to do so.”). 
 380. Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“It recognizes, as this Court has held, that 
a plaintiff has constitutional standing if the plaintiff demonstrates . . . ”); Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1386 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the arbitrator decides that the word ‘grain’ does include rye, the 
arbitrator will then . . . read the relevant provision.”). 
 381. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A]n Indiana nondriver . . . will find it 
difficult and expensive to travel to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, particularly if he or she resides in 
one of the . . . counties lacking a public transportation system.”). 
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E.   Setting a Different Standard 
1. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
Born in Brooklyn, New York, in 1933, Ruth Bader Ginsburg attended 
Harvard Law School and received an LL.B. from Columbia Law School.382  After 
clerking for a federal district court judge, she taught at both Rutgers and 
Columbia Law Schools,383 becoming the first woman to receive tenure at 
Columbia.384  In 1971, she helped to start the Women’s Rights Project of the 
ACLU and was that organization’s general counsel for seven years.385  In 1980, 
she joined the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, where she served until 1993, when 
President Clinton nominated her to the Supreme Court.386 
Considered one of the best writers on the Court, Justice Ginsburg has 
acknowledged that she works hard at the craft and produces “innumerable 
drafts” before she is satisfied.387  Her goal is to write an opinion so that no one 
will have to read a sentence twice to understand its meaning.388  Jeffrey Toobin 
has written that she is “free of illusions about the supposedly apolitical nature of 
judging.”389  During the three terms reviewed for this study, she was the lone 
woman on the Court.390 
Justice Ginsburg does not easily fit into either of the two previous 
categories.  While she cannot be described as “lagging behind,” she is not setting 
the standard described earlier in this article because she does not consistently 
use gender-neutral language in the strictest sense. 
Justice Ginsburg most easily fits into the alternating pronouns model: she 
uses both male and female generics.  But she does not alternate male and female 
generic pronouns within an opinion, in the manner described in Part II.  The 
most consistent pattern in her writing is to assign particular generics to 
particular actors throughout all her opinions, most noticeably by using female 
pronouns to refer generically to judges and to plaintiffs in civil cases, and by 
using male pronouns to refer to criminal defendants and prisoners. 
For example, Justice Ginsburg has used female-gendered pronouns to refer 
to the generic antecedents “judge,”391 “nonparty,”392 “person,’393 “party,’394 
 
 382. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 383. Id. 
 384. Bazelon, supra note 27, at 25. 
 385. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 386. Id. 
 387. See The Supreme Court – Ginsburg Interview Part 1, http://www.lawprose.org/ 
interviews/supreme_court.php (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 388. Id. 
 389. TOOBIN, supra note 144, at 329. 
 390. Bazelon, supra note 27, at 24. 
 391. See, e.g., Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 715 (2009) (“If the offenses do arise from the same 
course of conduct, the judge may still impose consecutive sentences if she finds either.”); 
Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 282 (2007) (“The Reform Act permitted but did not require a 
judge to exceed that standard range if she found ‘substantial and compelling reasons justifying an 
exceptional sentence.’”).  Compare id. at 306–07 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he California system . . . 
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“plaintiff,”395 “juror,”396 and “litigant.”397  She has used male-gendered pronouns 
to refer to the generic antecedents “defendant” (criminal),398 “inmate,”399 
“executioner,”400 “employee,”401 and “the Attorney General.”402  She has also 
 
recognizes that a sentencing judge must have the ability to look at all the relevant facts--even those 
outside the trial record and jury verdict--in exercising his or her discretion.”). 
 392. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2174 (2008) (“Our decisions recognizing that a nonparty 
may be bound by a judgment if she was adequately represented by a party to the earlier suit thus 
provide no support for the D.C. Circuit's broad theory of virtual representation.”). 
 393. Id. at 2173 (“[I]n some circumstances, a person may be bound by a judgment if she was 
adequately represented by a party to the proceeding yielding that judgment.”). 
 394. Id. at 2176 (“A party's representation of a nonparty is ‘adequate’ for preclusion purposes 
only if . . . : (1) the interests of the nonparty and her representative are aligned, . . . and (2) either the 
party understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity or the original court took care to 
protect the interests of the nonparty.”). 
 395. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2513 (2007) (“[U]nder our 
construction of the ‘strong inference’ standard, a plaintiff is not forced to plead more than she would 
be required to prove at trial.  A plaintiff alleging fraud in a § 10(b) action, we hold today, must plead 
facts rendering an inference of scienter at least as likely as any plausible opposing inference.  At trial, 
she must then prove her case by a ‘preponderance of the evidence.’  Stated otherwise, she must 
demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the defendant acted with scienter.”).  The plaintiff in 
this case was not a woman.  Earlier in the case, Justice Ginsburg used paired pronouns for the same 
antecedent: “to proceed beyond the pleading stage, the plaintiff must allege as to each defendant 
facts sufficient to demonstrate a culpable state of mind regarding his or her violations.”  Id. at 2511, 
n.6. 
 396. Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1454 (2009) (“We reject the notion that a juror is 
constitutionally disqualified whenever she is aware that a party has challenged her.  Were the rule 
otherwise, a party could circumvent Batson by insisting in open court that a trial court dismiss a 
juror even though the party's peremptory challenge was discriminatory.  Or a party could obtain a 
juror's dismissal simply by making in her presence a baseless for-cause challenge.”).  Although the 
challenged juror in this case was a woman, the quoted language is a broader statement about 
peremptory challenges in general, applicable to both male and female jurors. 
 397. Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262, 1277, n.17 (2009) (“When a litigant files a state-law 
claim in state court, and her opponent parries with a federal counterclaim, the action is not 
removable to federal court.”).  Although Vaden is a woman, it was she, not “her opponent,” who 
filed a counterclaim.  This supports the interpretation of this sentence as a general statement, meant 
to apply to male and female litigants. 
 398. See, e.g., Vermont v. Brillon, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1291 (2009) (“the relationship between a 
defendant and the public defender representing him”); Greenlaw, 128 S. Ct. at 2569 (“Thus a 
defendant who appeals but faces no cross-appeal can proceed anticipating that the appellate court 
will not enlarge his sentence.”).  Compare id. at 2573 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“When the Government 
files a notice of cross-appeal, the defendant is alerted to the possibility that his or her sentence may 
be increased.”). 
 399. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1571 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In California, a member of the IV team 
brushes the inmate’s eyelashes, speaks to him, and shakes him.”). 
 400. Id. at 1572 (“[T]hus the executioner’s training may lead him to push the drugs too fast.”). 
 401. Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 248 (2007) (“[I]t would make scant sense to read the Act as 
leaving an employee charged with an intentional tort to fend for himself when he denies 
wrongdoing and asserts he ‘engaged only in proper behavior occurring wholly within the scope of 
his office or employment.’”).  In this example (and in others), the choice of pronoun may have been 
influenced by a desire to be consistent with the quoted language.  An alternative approach would be 
to pluralize the noun and pronouns, and to replace the word his with [their] in the quotation.  Earlier 
in the same case, Justice Ginsburg used paired pronouns for a similar antecedent: “[T]he Act grants 
the Attorney General authority to certify that a federal employee named defendant in a tort action 
was acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time in question.”  Id. at 240–41. 
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used the gender-neutral techniques of pairing pronouns,403 pluralizing the noun 
and the pronoun,404 repeating the noun,405 and eliminating the need for a 
pronoun.406 
In Taylor v. Sturgell, Justice Ginsburg alternated the pronouns for the same 
antecedent within the same paragraph: 
Fourth, a nonparty is bound by a judgment if she “assume[d] control” over the 
litigation in which that judgment was rendered.  [Citations omitted] . Because 
such a person has had “the opportunity to present proofs and argument,” he has 
already “had his day in court” even though he was not a formal party to the 
litigation.  [Citation omitted]407 
By alternating pronouns in a way that assigns a gender to particular 
generic actors, Justice Ginsburg may be engaging in her own subtle form of 
“linguistic disruption,” an overtly feminist approach “to change norms of 
language use.”408  This approach seems to strive for gender equality, rather than 
gender neutrality.  Anne Curzan has identified this as a question of import for 
feminist linguists: “whether we are striving to make the language ‘gender equal’ 
when we are referring to both men and women, or whether we are striving to 
make gender less salient if we are referring to both men and women.”409  By 
referring to judges and litigants with female-gendered generics, Justice 
Ginsburg may be attempting to equalize the long history of judges and litigants 
being generically male.410  The larger issue is whether a technique that “actively 
 
 402. Id. at 241–42 (“The Act’s distinction between removed cases in which the Attorney General 
issues a scope-of-employment certification, and those in which he does not, leads us to conclude that 
Congress gave district courts no authority to return cases to state courts on the ground that the 
Attorney General’s certification was unwarranted.”).  In this example, Justice Ginsburg appears to be 
speaking generally, interpreting the Westfall Act, rather than referring to the acts of the particular 
Attorney General serving at the time. 
 403. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 788 (2009) (“[A]s stated in Brendlin, a traffic stop 
of a car communicates to a reasonable passenger that he or she is not free to terminate the encounter 
with the police and move about at will.”); Osborn, 549 U.S. at 240–41 (“[D]efendant in a tort action 
was acting within the scope of his or her employment.”); Tellabs, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2511, n.6 
(“[P]laintiff must allege as to each defendant facts . . . regarding his or her violations.”); Lawrence v. 
Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 342 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Tolling in the context here involved also 
protects a litigant’s ability to pursue his or her federal claims.”); id. (“Only by expeditiously filing for 
federal habeas relief will a prisoner ensure that the limitation period does not run before we have 
disposed of his or her petition for certiorari.”). 
 404. See, e.g., Brillon, 129 S. Ct. at 1292 (“We see no justification for treating defendants’ speedy-
trial claims differently based on whether their counsel is privately retained or publicly assigned.”). 
 405. Id. at 1293 (“[D]efense counsel are properly attributed to the defendant, even where counsel 
is assigned.”). 
 406. Vaden, 129 S. Ct. at 1276 (“Artful dodges by a §4 petitioner should not divert us from 
recognizing the actual dimensions of that controversy.”).  Here, Ginsburg used “that” in place of a 
pronoun. 
 407. 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2173 (2008). 
 408. See CURZAN, supra note 17, at 186–87. 
 409. Id. at 188. 
 410. See MURRAY & DESANCTIS, supra  note 70, at 174 (“There is no excuse for writing with sexist, 
male-dominated language in legal contexts” because “[a]ll judges, clients, and attorneys are not 
men.”  To “avoid sexist language,” the authors “use feminine pronouns in reference to lawyers, 
judges, and clients as often as we feel comfortable dong so.”). 
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challenges sexism in society” interferes with the sometimes competing goal of 
clarity in judicial opinions.411  In the example above from Taylor v. Sturgell, 
switching from female to male generic could be confusing for a reader. 
 2. Justice John Paul Stevens 
Born in 1920, John Paul Stevens is the oldest member of the Court.412  He 
served in the U.S. Navy in the 1940s and was a law clerk to Supreme Court 
Justice Wiley Rutledge during the 1947 Term.413  He was also Associate Counsel 
to the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House of 
Representatives Judiciary Committee, and a member of the Attorney General’s 
National Committee to Study Antitrust Law.414  In 1975, after he had served for 
five years on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Republican President Gerald 
Ford nominated Stevens to the Supreme Court.415  At the time, Stevens was 
considered a “judge’s judge” known for “thoroughness and his sophisticated 
arguments.”416  Ford believed that Stevens would be easily confirmed because 
he was not well known and did not appear to be a political partisan or a strict 
ideologue.417  By the end of his first term he was considered the Court’s “new 
moderate.”418  Over the course of his tenure on the Court, as it has become more 
conservative, he has become more liberal.419 
Justice Stevens is the closest to Justice Ginsburg in his use of gendered 
words.  He, too, alternates the use of gendered pronouns, most often using a 
female generic for lawyers, judges, and plaintiffs in civil actions, and using a 
male generic for criminal defendants.  Justice Stevens’s use of alternating 
pronouns was on display in his dissent in Montejo v. Louisiana, a criminal case 
from the 2008 Term: 
Because Miranda warnings do not hint at the ways in which a lawyer might 
assist her client during conversations with the police, I remain convinced that 
the warnings prescribed in Miranda, [footnote omitted] while sufficient to 
apprise a defendant of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, are inadequate 
to inform an unrepresented, indicted defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to 
have a lawyer present at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution.420 
 
 
 411. Writing about gender-neutral language in the field of technical writing, Katherine Durack 
notes that by “actively challenging sexism,” nonsexist language (as distinct from the less political 
gender-neutral language) “may draw attention to the text and away from the task at hand.”  Durack, 
supra note 25, at 193–94. 
 412. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/ 
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 413. Id. 
 414. Id. 
 415. Id. 
 416. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 401 
(1979) (providing a behind-the-scenes look at the work of the Court between 1969 and 1976). 
 417. Id. at 401. 
 418. Id. at 444. 
 419. TOOBIN, supra note 144, at 6. 
 420. 129 S. Ct. at 2100 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Harbison, 129 S. Ct. at 1488 (“It would 
require a federal lawyer who obtained relief for her client in § 2254 proceedings to continue to 
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In the above example, Stevens assigned a gendered pronoun based on the 
generic actor he was discussing: a feminine pronoun for a generic lawyer, and a 
masculine pronoun for a generic criminal defendant.  In an example from the 
2007 Term, Stevens alternated gendered generics for the antecedent noun 
“voter”: 
A voter who is indigent or has a religious objection to being photographed may 
cast a provisional ballot that will be counted only if she executes an appropriate 
affidavit.  . . . A voter who has photo identification but is unable to present that 
identification on election day may file a provisional ballot that will be counted if 
she brings her photo identification to the circuit county clerk’s office within 10 
days.421 
If the voter is casting his ballot in person, he must present local election officials 
with written identification[.]  . . . If the voter is voting by mail, he must include a 
copy of the identification with his ballot.422 
In the same case, Justice Souter also alternated pronouns for “voter,”423 
although he used male-gendered generics for other antecedents.424  Justice 
Breyer used paired pronouns and masculine-gendered generics.425  Justice Scalia 
used only masculine-gendered generics.426 
In the 2008 Term, Justice Stevens used female-gendered pronouns for the 
following antecedents: “plaintiff,”427 “lawyer,”428 “counsel,”429 and “alien.”430  
He used male-gendered pronouns for the antecedents “arrestee,”431 
 
represent him during his state retrial; similarly, it would require federal counsel to represent her 
client in any state habeas proceeding following her appointment.”). 
 421. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1613–14. 
 422. Id. at 1617–18; see also id. at 1620 (“[A] voter may lose his photo identification, may have his 
wallet stolen on the way to the polls.”). 
 423. Id. at 1637, 1641, n.33 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 424. Id. at 1634, 1638 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 425. Id. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 426. Id. at 1626 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 427. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 2195, 2208 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“True direct actions are lawsuits in which a plaintiff claims that she was injured by Manville and 
seeks recovery directly from its insurer without first obtaining a judgment against Manville.”); Altria 
Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 546 (2008) (“Certainly, the extent of the falsehood alleged may 
bear on whether a plaintiff can prove her fraud claim.”). 
 428. Harbison, 129 S. Ct. at 1488. 
 429. Id. at 1486, 1487 n.6. 
 430. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1172 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“In Cardoza-
Fonseca, the question was whether the standard of INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982 ed.), which 
requires an alien to show that she is more likely than not to be subject to persecution if she is 
deported, also governs applications for asylum under § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982 ed.), which 
authorizes the Attorney General to grant asylum to an alien who has a well-founded fear of 
persecution in her home country.”).  Although the respondent in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
421 (1987), was a woman, this sentence speaks more generally about the requirements of the statute 
and the responsibilities of the Attorney General.  Later in the same case, Justice Stevens uses a 
masculine-gendered generic for the same antecedent.  Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1176, n.8. 
 431. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718 (“[I]t is improbable that an arrestee could gain access to weapons 
stored in his vehicle after he has been handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol car.”). 
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“motorist,”432 “officer,”433 “defendant” (criminal),434 “prisoner,”435 “golfer,”436 
“petitioner” (habeas),437 “alien,”438 “person,”439 and “employee.”440 
In the 2007 Term, Stevens used masculine pronouns to refer to the 
following generic antecedents: “district judge,”441 “criminal defendant,”442 
“candidate,”443 and “inmate.”444  No feminine-gendered generics were noted in 
this term.  In the 2006 Term, Justice Stevens alternated pronouns in Bell Atlantic 
v. Twombly, using both a male pronoun445 and a female pronoun446 to refer to the 
 
 432. Id. at 1720 (“[A] motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his 
home.”). 
 433. Id. at 1721 (“[I]ncident to arrest, an officer may conduct a limited protective sweep of those 
areas of a house in which he reasonably suspects a dangerous person may be hiding.”). 
 434. See, e.g., Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2248–49 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[N]ot enough for a defendant 
to . . . ; instead, evidence that he operated, managed, or directed those affairs is required.”); Dean, 129 
S. Ct. at 1859 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“That a defendant will be subject to punishment for the harm 
resulting from a discharge whether or not he is also subject to the enhanced penalty . . . indicates that 
the latter provision was intended to serve a different purpose.”); Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1782 
(2009) (“[W]e have held that when the State withholds from a criminal defendant evidence that is 
material to his guilt or punishment, it violates his right to due process of law in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 435. Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2113 (“[U]nder this scheme, a prisoner seeking damages from a 
correction officer will have his claim dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”). 
 436. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. at 1827 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As any golfer who has 
watched his partner shank a short approach knows, it would be absurd to accept the suggestion that 
the resultant four-letter word uttered on the golf course describes sex or excrement and is therefore 
indecent.”). 
 437. Cone, 129 S. Ct. at 1780. 
 438. Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1176, n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[A]n 
alien’s lack of knowledge that he was involved in a persecutory act, could likewise indicate that he 
did not act with the requisite culpability.”).  Justice Stevens also used a feminine-gendered generic 
for the same antecedent.  See id. at 1172. 
 439. Id. at 1174 n.6 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“The CAT prohibits a state 
party from returning any person to a country where there is substantial reason to believe he might 
be tortured.”). 
 440. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1475 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court also noted the problem 
of entrusting a union with certain arbitration decisions given the potential conflict between the 
collective interest and the interests of an individual employee seeking to assert his rights.”). 
 441. Gall,128 S. Ct. at 594 (“[A] district judge must give serious consideration to the extent of any 
departure from the Guidelines and must explain his conclusion.”); see also id. at 596–97.  In the same 
case, Justice Alito used several gender-neutral techniques to avoid a gendered pronoun for “judge,” 
including pluralizing, pairing pronouns, and using the term “district court” in place of “district 
judge.”  See id. at 604–05, 608 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 442. Id. at 596. 
 443. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2780 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“[T]he 
Millionaire’s Amendment . . . does no more than assist the opponent of a self-funding candidate in 
his attempts to make his voice heard; . . . If only one candidate can make himself heard, the voter’s 
ability to make an informed choice is impaired.”); see also id. at 2778, 2781–82. 
 444. Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1548 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“But by requiring that an execution be 
relatively painless, we necessarily protect the inmate from enduring any punishment that is 
comparable to the suffering inflicted on his victim.”). 
 445. Bell Atlantic Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1977 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Once it is clear that a plaintiff 
has stated a claim that, if true, would entitle him to relief, matters of proof are appropriately 
relegated to other stages of the trial process.”). 
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plaintiff.  He also used a female-gendered pronoun to refer to the antecedent 
“judge.”447 
Justice Stevens has also used the gender-neutral writing techniques of 
pluralizing the pronoun and the antecedent.448  In several cases, he used 
gendered nouns, including “craftsmen,”449 and “draftsmen.”450 
F.   The Court Should Increase Its Use of Gender-Neutral Language 
The research presented in this article demonstrates that while most 
members of the Court are making some effort to avoid male-gendered generics, 
the overall picture is one of inconsistency.  Most of the justices could and should 
increase their use of gender-neutral language.  In too many instances, their 
writing communicates subtle sexism, distracts the reader, and creates ambiguity.  
The rewards in more effective communication to be gained from decreasing the 
use of gendered generics far outweigh the minimal effort needed to make the 
change. 
Justice Alito provides a model that should be followed by all the justices.  
He avoids gendered generics without sacrificing style.  Justice Scalia appears to 
be the hardest to convince that such a change has value, based on his own 
statements and the frequent appearance of male-gendered generics in his 
opinions.  It is encouraging, however, that Bryan Garner was able to persuade 
him to draft their coauthored book using gender-neutral language.  This may be 
a sign that if his colleagues on the Court move toward greater use of gender-
neutral techniques, he may follow. 
Justice Ginsburg’s approach of alternating pronouns by actor cannot easily 
be dismissed, even though it is not technically gender neutral.  On the one hand, 
this method shifts the reader out of the comfort zone of the masculine as 
universal, and attempts to equalize a historical imbalance.  On the other hand, it 
may force the writer into value judgments that are equally unfair. 
Writers who use alternating pronouns are faced with a number of choices 
that may result in this method being more trouble than it is worth.  For example, 
a writer may be forced to count the number of times each pronoun is used to be 
certain that they are equal.  A writer will also need to decide whether male and 
 
 446. Id. at 1980, n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A plaintiff's inability to persuade a district court 
that the allegations actually included in her complaint are ‘plausible’ is an altogether different kind 
of failing, and one that should not be fatal at the pleading stage.”). 
 447. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“After all, a district judge who gives harsh 
sentences to Yankees fans and lenient sentences to Red Sox fans would not be acting reasonably even 
if her procedural rulings were impeccable.”). 
 448. See, e.g., Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at 1175 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“We 
do not normally convict individuals of crimes when their actions are coerced or otherwise 
involuntary.”); Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595–96 (“Probationers may not leave the judicial district . . . without 
notifying . . . their probation officer or the court.”). 
 449. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2846 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Today judicial craftsmen have confidently 
asserted that a policy choice that denies a ‘law-abiding, responsible citize[n]’ the right to keep and 
use weapons in the home for self-defense is ‘off the table.’”). 
 450. LaRue, 128 S. Ct. at 1025 (“Whether a fiduciary breach diminishes plan assets payable to all 
participants and beneficiaries, or only to persons tied to particular individual accounts, it creates the 
kind of harms that concerned the draftsmen of § 409.”). 
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female pronouns will be alternated by paragraph, by actor, and if the writer is a 
judge, whether consistency across opinions is a goal.  These may be obstacles 
more easily overcome for the author of a book, or a law review article, where the 
writer’s intent can be more easily communicated.  Judicial opinions are less 
subject to control.  They may be written by one, but usually represent the 
opinion of a group.  They are taken apart, edited down, and excerpted in 
casebooks, newspapers, and briefs.  Context can easily be lost, and clarity lost 
along with it.  A full exploration of whether alternating pronouns is an effective 
technique in judicial opinions, given the special needs of the reader for clarity 
and precision, is beyond the scope of this article.  An in-depth analysis of this 
issue is worthy of further research. 
With the availability of good techniques that retain clarity and readability, 
the justices have little excuse to continue to use gendered generics.  Several 
actions could help to facilitate the Court’s increased use of gender-neutral 
language.  As Chew and Kelley-Chew have advocated, professional 
organizations in the legal field, including the American Bar Association and the 
American Association of Law Schools should follow those in the scientific and 
social science communities and strongly promote gender-neutral language.451  
Law clerks, who already have a role in editing opinions,452 can be trained to 
check for gender-neutral language, as they might check for other matters of style 
and grammar.  The lawyers who submit briefs to the Court should use the 
invisible gender-neutral techniques most were trained to use in law school, 
impressing upon the justices the wide acceptance of the practice and 
demonstrating its readability. 
The justices should also be open to all the possible methods of making their 
writing gender neutral.  If the only remedy is to replace gendered generics with 
“he or she,” the critics who worry about the result being tedious and repetitive 
might be proved right. 
CONCLUSION 
Once we accept that gender-neutral language in legal writing is a 
worthwhile goal, it is essential to look to the highest court to help to set the 
standard.  The use of gender-neutral language by Justice Alito shows that it can 
be done without sacrificing style.  The continued use of gendered generics 
interferes with the important responsibility of the Court to communicate 
effectively to judges, lawyers, students, and the public.  The increased use of 
gender-neutral language by the Court is a goal worthy of attention.  
Realistically, judges are in the best position to change the language of the law.453  
 
 451. Chew & Kelly-Chew, supra note 13, at 675. 
 452. See generally Peppers & Zorn, supra note 144, at 56.  In their interviews with Bryan Garner, 
several justices noted that their clerks help to edit their opinions.  The Supreme Court – Stevens 
interview, Part 2; Breyer interview, Part 2, http://www.lawprose.org/interviews/ 
supreme_court.php (last visited October 14, 2009). 
 453. Lebovits, Curtin & Solomon, supra note 138, at 239.  ("Judges occupy a special position in the 
legal community.  They are in a unique position to influence it.  Judges can give momentum to--or 
stop--trends developing in the legal profession.  . . . Judges are professional writers . . . who can and 
should use opinions to influence the legal profession for the better.”). 
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While we cannot go back and change Marbury or Lochner, it is time for all the 
members of the Roberts Court to set a gender-neutral standard.  The addition of 
the newest justice may move the Court closer to that standard.454 
 
 
 454. See Fischer, supra note 14, at 496.  Professor Fischer’s research showed that while on the 
Court of Appeals, Judge Sotomayor frequently used the gender-neutral technique of pairing 
pronouns. 
